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Introduction
The unification of the German state in 1990 was the conclusion of a unique period
in German history; suddenly, the German state, which has been abruptly divided in 1945,
was reunited within a year. During the period of their separation, unique societies were
created within the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic
Republic (GDR). The rapid political unification left little time for significant policy
reconstruction to be undertaken at the government level, but the period did serve as a
spark to begin the discussion of ordinary Germans, particularly German women, about
their place in society. Even more than German men, women in East and West Germany
were faced with markedly different social structures. West German women were
primarily confined to life within the home, while nearly all East German women
participated in the labor force. Consequently, significantly different social patterns and
expectations for women developed within each society. Unification forced Eastern
women to rapidly come to terms with the realities of political rights and privileges, as
well as the employment prospects, afforded to women in the Federal Republic. At the
same time, West German women saw women like themselves, nearly all of who had
spent the last forty years in the workforce, an experience that was far less common for
West German women. They, also, saw a society were abortion had been legal and free,
government-sponsored childcare had been universally provided. A discussion about these
differences ensued between the two groups, which led to demands for changes in Federal
Republic law and practice, some of which were realized, and others, which they continue
to fight for fifteen years later.
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Prior to 1945, since the initial German unification under Otto von Bismarck,
Germany was a united nation with a shared language, culture and history. In the wake of
World War II, the country was divided both suddenly and arbitrarily by the occupying
powers. The immediate outbreak of the Cold War at the end of World War II placed the
newly divided Germany in a unique situation; the country, war ravaged and decimated
both physically and emotionally by the rise and fall of National Socialism, was now also
the front line of the Cold War. What followed shaped the future of Germany: the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) became a capitalist, social democracy backed by the
Western powers; the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became a socialist/communist
state backed by the Eastern Bloc.
West Germany, and the present unified Germany, are a federalist states with
strong individual states, or Länder, which were established by the Constitution. Under the
Constitution, the Länder have specific areas in which they are entitled to legislate, which
include education, police and health insurance. Germany is a chancellor democracy with
a strong party system. Two major parties and a series of minor parties have existed since
the inception of the FRG. The two major parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), are politically just right and just left of center,
respectively. Together with the Free Democratic Party (FDP), a small free-market party,
they have exchanged power cyclically since the Basic Law, or Constitution, was
established in 1949. The FRG’s first chancellor, CDU leader Konradt Adenauer,
established the precedence of a strong chancellor at the center of the federal government.
Throughout the history of the FRG, chancellors have centered the domestic debate
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around foreign policy concerns, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) during the
unification period.1
The United States strongly influenced the FRG in the postwar years. The Marshall
Plan significantly affected the West German economy, which led to the period of great
economic prosperity known as the Wirtschaftwunder, or economic miracle. In many
ways, West German life in West Germany resembled life in the United States during the
postwar years. The 1950s model of mother as homemaker and father as breadwinner also
established itself within Germany, in many ways; this model cemented itself into German
culture even more deeply than it did in American culture. As in the United States and
much of Western Europe, the 1960s ushered in a period of youth counterculture. The
German Student Movement was a reaction against “perceived authoritarianism and
hypocrisy” of government.2 The movement was particularly significant because it
signified a shift in student politics from conservative to radical leftist; in 1969,Willy
Brandt (SPD) became chancellor. He was elected on a platform of reforming and
liberalizing domestic politics, while he is best known for his Ostpolitik; his election
further evidenced the leftward shift of German culture. The leftward shift continued
through the 1970s, culminating with the founding of the Green Party in 1979. During the
1980s, there was a rightward rebound, with the re-election of the CDU as the majority
party; Helmut Kohl (CDU) became chancellor in 1982.
Life in East Germany differed considerably from life in the West. East Germany
was known as perhaps the most repressive of the Eastern Bloc states. It was home to the
1
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notorious Stasi, the secret police and intelligence organization infamous for tracking,
harassing, torturing, and jailing dissenters. The GDR was led by the Socialist Unity Party
(SED), which created an authoritarian, centrally planned government. Walter Ulbricht
was the secretary general from 1950-1971, when Erich Honecker became secretary
general; he remained in place until 1989. The GDR was considered to be a state of
workers and peasants, with the established goal of the state being to eliminate inequality
through work. Consequently, much of GDR life revolved around the factory, including
social organizations. The GDR suffered from a severe emigration problem, with many
people defecting to the West through West Berlin. Problematically, the GDR citizens
who were leaving East Germany were its best and brightest, which led to a serious “brain
drain.” The GDR solved this problem in 1961, with the erection of the Berlin Wall during
the night of August 13th.
The Wall quickly became a physical symbol of the Iron Curtin. Initially, it was
unclear what the result of the Wall would be, but it became clear that the Wall’s presence
assuaged some of the tension between the FRG and the GDR, which allowed for détente
to set in. Détente led to Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, which, for the first time, established
limited political, economic, and cultural relations between the FRG and the GDR.3 In
regards to his Ostpolitik, Brandt famously proclaimed, “we must prevent a further
estrangement of the German nation and try to move beyond an ordered co-existence
(Nebeneinander) to real cooperation (Miteinander).”4
Through the 1970s and 1980s, despite ongoing efforts by the GDR to maintain a
viable state, it became increasingly clear that the state was going bankrupt. Additionally,
3
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shortages of consumer goods were becoming more prevalent and morale among GDR
citizens was declining. As reforms came to the USSR under Gorbachev, East Germans
became increasingly upset that the GDR government did not also adopt reforms. They
began to form citizens led by intellectuals and the Protestant church demanding “personal
liberties, freedom of travel, free elections, the licensing of opposition groups, and an end
to secret police terror.”5 By late summer, protests and demonstrations began to take hold
and the GDR dissolved quickly. Patton describes the situation:
Departures and demonstrations were the two-pronged assault on the East
German regime. As tens of thousands fled the country, hundreds of
thousands demanded reform. As tens of thousands fled the country,
hundreds of thousands demanded reform. Under growing pressure, the
ruling Communist elite considered—but without Soviet assistance did not
risk—a “Chinese solution,” that is, a massacre. On October 18, the
politburo member Egon Krenz replaced the aged Erich Honecker as head
of the ruling SED, thereby becoming the top East German leader. Yet the
disintegration of Communist power continued unabated. On November 6,
the government resigned; the next day the politburo stepped down; and on
November 9, amidst a good deal of confusion, the Berlin Wall opened.6
The Berlin Wall came down just as suddenly as it had gone up, but instead of the sadness
felt in 1961, East Germans felt great joy in its destruction.
The unexpected destruction of the Wall placed Germans, both Eastern and
Western, in an interesting moment. Never before had a nation been faced, so abruptly, by
a prospect the likes of unification. Initially, elections, known as the Volkskammer
elections, were held in East Germany on March 18, 1932.7 The “Alliance for Germany,”
led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU), which consisted of the CDU and two other
conservative parties, won the elections. The group had run on the platform of a rapid
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currency union, unification by Article 23, and market reform.8 Consequently, Kohl
pursued a policy of rapid unification, beginning with a currency union, which favorably
exchanged East German marks for West German marks at 1:1. Furthermore, Article 23,
or the “go fast” method of unification was pursued, rather than the Article 146, or “go
slow” method, which was favored by the SPD and the former-communist party, now
known as the PDS.
Despite its rapidity, unification presented the opportunity for an evaluation of the
positive and negative points of both German societies. While the upper echelons of
politics were generally unconcerned with the social aspects of unification, primarily
because of the speed with which it occurred, the people of both Germanies were
interested in using unification as an opportunity to explore the finer points of their
societies. Additionally, the legalities of the social policies in East and West Germany
differed considerable, especially in regards to women. German women debated both the
effects of social policy, and how possible changes to it, would affect their lives, either
positively or negatively.
This debate played out in the pages of women’s magazines. For the purposes of
this thesis, two women’s magazines, one East German and one West German, were
analyzed. The West German women’s magazine investigated was Emma, the East
German magazine Für Dich. Emma was first published in January 1977 under the
leadership of well-known feminist Alice Schwarzer.9 Emma prides itself on having
broken social taboos since its inception; it lists the following important moments as
important to its history on its website: 1977 the first protest against clitorectomies; 1978
8
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the first anti-pornography lawsuit; 1979 the first discussion about the dangers of Islamic
fundamentalism; since the 1980s, the demand for full day schools; 1984 the first
information about help for those with eating disorders; since 1999, the publicizing of
“daughter days,” which are similar to “Take Your Daughter to Work Day” in the U.S.10
Schwarzer as an individual is important not only to Emma, but to the overall
framing of the unification debate. As West Germany’s most well known and prolific
feminist, Schwarzer possessed the prominence and visibility necessary to catapult issues
that she personally favored on to center stage. The effects of this power were mixed.
Schwarzer focused her resources on two issues, primarily; legalized abortion and antipornography legislation. Problematically, the first of these issues was widely supported
by feminists across the spectrum, but the second was not. Rather, feminists of a most
leftist, radical bent wholly rejected anti-pornography legislation as a limitation of sexual
freedom. Both of these issues will be explored within the context of unification and the
feminist discourse during the period.
Für Dich was a characteristically different publication, especially before it
became completely obvious that the GDR was not going to survive. Für Dich was a
weekly women’s magazine that was run and published, as all publications were, by the
GDR government. As a result, prior to the disintegration of the GDR becoming a
certainty, Für Dich continued to represent the government position, while it discussed
issues concerning women, it stayed clear of anything controversial or against the party
line. Through most of 1989, the magazine continued to focus on publishing these types of
articles; for example, every magazine contained a section on things that could be made
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from household goods, like simple games and costumes for children. Additionally, it
published articles that had very little to do with life in the GDR, for example in February
1989 an article with facts about poisonous spiders appeared in its pages. Notably, the fall
of the Berlin Wall was barely acknowledged into the magazine until early 1990; the
initial event appeared as a two-page news article within the pages of the magazine; it was
not even mentioned on the cover. However, with the turn of the calendar year from 1989
to 1990, and, with it, the obvious disintegration of the GDR, Für Dich took on a new
stance. The magazine adopted a progressive stance of women’s issues, and its editors and
writers proceed to begin the process of informing the women of the GDR about the
massive changes taking place around them. As the largest GDR women’s magazine, it
quickly developed a cooperative relationship with Emma, with which it worked on issues
of communication between East and West German women. Importantly, Für Dich did not
simply become a West German magazine, it worked to maintain its Eastern roots and
present issues from the perspective of Eastern women. Unfortunately, by the end of the
unification period Für Dich no longer has the financial support it needed to maintain
itself as an independent publication and it merged with Emma in the early 1990s.
For the purposes of this thesis, these articles were used in order to gain insight
into those issues that were most important to women during the unification period. In
order to collect pertinent articles and to get a sense of the magazines, each issue of both
magazines published from January 1889 to December 1991 in the archives’ collections
was reviewed. Articles that were related to the following subjects were copied for
subsequent analysis: those that discussed an issue which directly impact the lives of
women, those about women’s issues, those related to current events, and those that
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centered around policy discussions or politics in general. In all, about 300 articles were
collected from the archives.
The articles for this thesis were collected in the archives of women’s centers in
Germany. In the former West Germany, research was conducted at Frauen Forschungs
Stelle, e.V. in Münster, Germany, a center which specializes in women’s history. In the
former East Germany, research was conducted at EWA e.V. Frauenzentrum in the former
East Berlin. The center in Münster had a clearly complete collection of Emma from the
period, while the center in Berlin had a nearly complete collection of Für Dich.
The thesis describes and analyses the important issues concerning women and
feminism, which came to the forefront during unification. Through this description and
analysis, it proves that while significant policy changes to reduce the inherent social,
political and economic inequalities did not result from unification to establish themselves
within the Germany state that resulted, it should be noted as a feminist moment in
German history because of the discussion that it prompted among ordinary women.

Chapter 1: The History of German Feminism
The influence of gender on the lives of individuals in Germany was significant
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and furthermore, notions of gender
continue to substantially affect the lives of Germans today. Traditionally, German society
has been strongly patriarchal, with men dominating in both the public and private
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spheres. For all of the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century, gender
equality by law did not exist; substantial strides in women’s rights were not made in the
latter half of the twentieth century. For over 150 years, however, German women worked
to give themselves a voice within this model, with the first formal women’s organizations
forming in the mid-nineteenth century. The patriarchal society, with its traditional
concept of gender roles, extensively shaped the German women’s movement; domesticity
remained an important and central characteristic of the German women’s movement until
the late twentieth century, when both the gender model of the GDR, and gay and lesbian
movements, challenged this model.
The initial feminist movement began in 1848 and stemmed from the March
Revolution, which was part of a number of liberal revolutions around the world during
that year. In Germany, mass demonstrations took place in which citizens demanded
freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, arming of the people and a national German
parliament. The early women’s movement focused on obtaining more basic political
rights for women. The movement was not particularly concerned with specific issues,
such as suffrage, access to birth control, or equal rights under the law, but, rather, they
hoped to simply expand their very limited rights. The movement has shifted between
more liberal and more conservative phases, but, over time, most moderate feminists have
persisted in their support of women’s traditional familial roles. Furthermore, an
additional interesting aspect of German feminism is a strong class division within the
movement. Within the movement exist separate, and sometimes competing, bourgeois
and proletariat women’s movements. By tracing the evolution of the women’s movement
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and the changes in rights afforded to women during the twentieth century, both
consistencies and changes in the model can be seen.
1848-World War I
Prior to World War I, the women’s movement went through three distinct phases,
due to changes in government policy. The German women’s movement started gradually.
The first period of the movement, from 1848 to 1865, was characterized by discreet
actions: for example, anonymous letters to the editor, political poetry, and socially critical
novels.11 The first political women’s press began in 1843, from 1849-1851, Louise Otto,
who is described as the “mother of the German women’s movement,” was the editor of
the most well-known of the women’s newspapers, Frauen-Zeitung.12 A government that
was hostile towards challenges to the status quo, however minor, limited these early
forays into feminism, and even these subtle actions by early feminists were not without
some risk.
Notably, in the early years of the movement, women played a significant role in
the free-religious movement. Within this movement, women enjoyed equal recognition
and participation, which made it particularly attractive to budding feminists, as women’s
participation was restricted within other organizations.13 Also, during this period, the first
feminist organizations were created, which included: Democratic Women’s Associations,
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organizations to promote the education of women and girls, women’s labor associations,
and social welfare organizations run by women, for women.14
However the women’s movement, which was still in its infancy, faced a
tremendous setback when repressive measures were put into place by the government in
an attempt to undermine political dissenters and others whom they believed posed a
threat to the government, as a result of the upheaval from the revolution in 1848. The
political climate was repressive. In 1850, laws were put into place with the goal of
suppressing democratic endeavors. These laws included the Press Laws, which made it
expressly illegal for women to be newspaper editors, and the Vereinsgesetze (Laws
Restricting Associations), which prevented women’s groups, as well as other groups with
democratic goals, from forming political organizations or holding political gatherings.15
This state oppression lasted for two generations and hurt the women’s movement, as well
as other burgeoning movements, considerably.
The mid-1860s ushered in a period of relaxation of these laws, and the women’s
movement again moved into the public sphere. In 1865, Louise Otto and Auguste
Schmidt, two well-known feminists, organized a conference that intended to bring
together “…German women of the different cities and states.”16 These conferences were
the first of their kind in Germany. At the same time, women’s organizations were
founded throughout Germany, most notably the Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein
(General German Women’s Association), or ADF. The ADF can be characterized as a
progressive organization for two important reasons. First, the organization united women
in the whole of Germany, despite the fact that Germany had not yet obtained complete
14
15
16
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political unification. Secondly, the ADF was Germany’s first truly feminist organization
in that it embraced the “…principle of self-help and self-determination and its conscious
independence from male participation and decision making,” in other words, equal
rights.17 The ADF and other women’s organizations focused themselves on “practical
self-help” and attempted to further their cause through petitions to the Reichstag and
government, surveys and publications, and a special newspaper, titled, Neue Bahnen
(New Track), which was published from 1866-1919.
There was an upturn in the women’s movement around 1890 with the dismissal of
Bismarck and the end of the Anti-Socialist laws. However, around this time it was
becoming increasingly evident that a substantial, and possibly insurmountable, gap was
forming between the middle-class and working-class women’s movements. In 1889 Clara
Zetkin, a well-known socialist who would become the leader of the proletariat women’s
movement, gave a famous speech in Paris in which socialism and women’s issues were
cemented together.18 This speech formed the basis of socialist theories of women’s
emancipation and was also very influential to the growing working class women’s
movement in Germany. In 1893, Clara Zetkin founded her own newspaper for the
proletariat women’s movement, called Die Gleichheit.19 Bridenthal, Grossmann, and
Kaplan comment, “By 1894, after several attempts at cooperation had failed to breach an
ever widening rift, the German women’s movement had confirmed class and ideological
divisions that were to endure.”20
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At this point, the leadership between these two movements became firmly
divided, with Zetkin as the ideological leader of the working women’s movement, which
existed under the auspices of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and Helen Lange and
Gertrud Bäumer as the leaders of the middle class movement. In 1894, the middle class
movement consolidated into the Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine (Federation of German
Women’s Associations), or BDF, which acted as the umbrella organization for the ADF
and its splinter groups. These groups were involved in a range of issues from education
(Allgemeiner Deutscher Lehrerinnenverein/ General German Association of Female
Teachers) to legal work (Rechtschutzverein Dresden/ Dresden Legal Aid and Protection
Agency). 21 22
In the late 1880s, both the bourgeois and proletarian movements independently
established goals concerning those areas in which they thought it most important to focus
their efforts.23 The primary demands of the BDF were to improve legal status and
working conditions, as well as to provide better educational and professional
opportunities for women. They also began a sexual hygiene movement. However, they
did not demand suffrage until 1902.24 The women of the SPD consistently supported the
right to vote—but emphasized class over gender solidarity, and women’s integration into
the workforce. The two mainstream groups shared a commitment to the traditional
familial roles of women and remained dedicated to “…ideals of female duty, service, and
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self-sacrifice.”25 While the two groups differed on other issues, this shared commitment
was important to both; furthermore, it is a sign of their shared cultural heritage, which
plays a significant role in the women’s movements of all societies. Bridenthal,
Grossmann, and Kaplan explain, “[German] feminism, like that of women in most other
nations, was time and culture-bound. It consisted of an amalgam of women-oriented
concerns, internalized patriarchal values, and a peculiarly German deference to the whole
community, whether perceived as the class or the nation.”26
Also in the 1890s, a movement, which became known as the “new morality”,
materialized. This movement, which was very small and considered to be radical, was the
first sign of the contemporary feminist movement within Germany. “New morality”
groups supported increased availability of birth control, suffrage, and the end of stateregulated prostitution.27
As a movement progressed into the twentieth century, divisions also formed
between moderate and liberal feminists within the bourgeois movement. The moderate
feminists remained the mainstream majority, but the liberal feminists, who grew out of
and sustained the “new morality” movement, became an increasingly significant faction.
The moderates were motivated by the concept of “spiritual motherhood”, which
emphasized the importance of “…the real and intrinsic duty of women.” They saw
motherhood as the “duty” and “destiny” of “the majority of women.” As a result, they
believed in strict limits on women’s liberation in the realms of matrimony and sex. 28 The
liberals, whose ideas were viewed as “anarchistic feminist thinking” by moderates, were
25
26
27
28
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radical individualists and they demanded equality and autonomy in matrimonial and
family relations, as well as self-determination in sexuality. To liberals, emancipation was
a legal issue. Not surprisingly, they opposed the Civil Code for its lack of women’s
rights, particularly in marriage. They believed that equal participation in government and
politics would ultimately lead to fundamental social and political change.29 The
proletarian women’s movement also demanded equality in matrimonial and family law,
as well as unrestricted voting rights; however, their reasons centered on labor and the
socialist ideology of equality through work, rather than because of notions of
individualism.30
World War I- Weimar Republic
World War I, like most major wars, significantly impacted all social movements,
including both the bourgeois and proletariat women’s movements. During the war,
working class women joined the industrial labor force in droves to make up for the male
labor shortage. Meanwhile, middle class women attempted to mitigate the “catastrophic
social conditions” brought on by the war.31 Both groups participated in some form of
anti-war activism. As early as April 1915, a wing of the bourgeois feminists who
promoted pacifism met with international women’s groups at The Hague.32 Proletariat
women also formed a branch that opposed the war, which met with other women’s
groups in Switzerland.33
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The end of the war and the establishment of the Weimar Republic brought an
unexpected change in the legal status of women—suffrage for all adults, which was
granted on November 12, 1918.34 The birth of the politically liberal Weimar Republic,
run by the Social Democratic Party, essentially guaranteed political, but not economic,
rights for German women.35 The Constitution of the Weimar Republic, which became
law on August 11, 1919, established, “Men and women have fundamentally the same
civil rights and duties.”36 Article 128 also established, “All citizens without distinction
are to be admitted to public office in accordance with the laws and according their
abilities and qualifications.”37 Prior to the establishment of the Weimar Republic, no
serious consideration had been given to the idea of women’s suffrage within the
government; the only genuine discussion about the issue had taken place within the
proletariat women’s movement; consequently, suffrage came at something of a surprise.
While the new constitution afforded women many more rights than they had in
the past, it did not deal with the central issues of family and matrimonial law, which were
still governed by the Civil Code from 1900. The Civil Code established that husbands
had the final say in all marital matters, that husbands could decide whether or not their
wives could work outside the home, and it forced women to work without pay in their
husband’s business. 38 However, laws were passed in an attempt to uphold the spirit of the
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Basic Law. These laws gave women the right to work both before and after childbirth and
to pursue legal professions.39
The results of these new laws, in combination of the end of the war and the
beginning of the Depression, were mixed. Between 1907 and 1925, the number of women
in the workforce increased by 35 percent, while the number of women in white-collar
jobs increased 248.3 percent between 1907 and 1933.40 Still, these numbers take the war
years into account, which unquestionably led to a rise in the overall percentage of female
employment, so the relationship between the upsurge in employment during this period
and the Weimar laws is questionable. During the post-war years, the predictable rollback
in female employment occurred as they moved out of wartime jobs and back into
traditional women’s jobs.41 Furthermore, the Depression led to a decline in support for
women working outside the home. Married women were seen as “double earners” who
took jobs from men with families.42 Consequently, many women pursed work primarily
from the end of school until marriage, during the Weimar years.43
Additionally, the Civil Code governed divorce, and made it impossible for women
to divorce their husbands except on “absolute grounds”, which were limited to adultery,
willful desertion, bigamy, and sodomy.44 The lack of attention to this important issue
upset both middle-class and working-class feminists, both of whom wanted divorce
reform. Both groups wanted divorces to be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences; however, the unwillingness of the Catholic and Protestant Churches to budge
39

ibid., 161
ibid., 161, 163
41
Bridenthal, Grossmann and Kaplan, When Biology Became Destiny : Women in
Weimar and Nazi Germany, 7
42
ibid., 10
43
Boak, Women in Weimar Germany : The "Frauenfrage" and the Female, 166
44
ibid., 161
40

18

on this issue did not help their cause.45 The Weimar Republic, however, did go against
the Churches in May 1926 when the Reichstag made abortion a misdemeanor, rather than
a subsidiary offense.46
The Weimar period also gave birth to the “new woman” during the 1920s. “The
‘new women’—who voted, used contraception, obtained illegal abortions, and earned
wages—were more than a bohemian minority or an artistic convention. They existed in
the office and factory, bedroom and kitchen, just as surely as—and more significantly
than—in café and cabaret.”47 The emergence of this “new woman” in a rapidly
liberalized society is not surprising. To some degree, the shackles of Kinder, Küche,
Kirche48, had been thrown off, and it is not surprising that women would be anxious to
explore this newfound freedom.
Nazi Germany
Consequently, women’s eager support of the anti-feminist is unexpected. The
Weimar years, which were “good years” for women’s rights in the course of Germany
history, particularly up until this point, were quickly negated by the Nazis quick turn
away from women’s rights and back towards “traditional” women’s roles. The Nazis saw
the "new woman," who represented the Weimar years, as a symptom of Bolshevik
radicalism and American consumerism. Instead, the Nazis advocated a concept of
womanhood that was far more conservative than the Weimar Republic’s conception. The
Nazis believed firmly in traditional women’s roles—Aryan women were expected to
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marry and to have many children. Additionally, women were expected to keep an orderly
home and, as a result of overall shortages, to make limited demands as consumers.49
Alfred Rosenberg, who helped in the founding of the “blood and soil” principle of
Nazism, described his feelings on liberalism and feminism in his 1935 work Der Mythos
des 20. Jahrhunderts, which helped to form the basis of the Nazi doctrine on women’s
rights.
The invasion of the women’s movement into the collapsing world
of the nineteenth century proceeded on a broad front and was inevitably
intensified by all the other destructive forces: world trade, democracy,
Marxism, parliamentarianism.…
Liberalism teaches: freedom, permissiveness, free trade,
parliamentarianism, women’s emancipation, human equality, sexual
equality, etc., i.e. it is a sin against a law of nature, [which is] that
creativity occurs only through the generation of tensions arising from
polarity.…The German idea today, in the midst of the collapse of the
feminized old world demands: authority, a fine model of strength, the
setting of limits, discipline, autarky (self-sufficiency), protection of the
racial character, recognition of the eternal polarity of the sexes.50
From this statement, it seems that it was clear to Rosenberg that feminism
was both symptomatic of, and responsible for, the problems of the beginning of
the twentieth century. He presents the idea of feminism as a threat to the future
and as partially responsible for the destruction of the recent past. This piece by
Rosenberg is emblematic of the Nazis’s feelings toward feminism, of which they
were not supportive.
The Nazis were clear opponents of women’s rights, and consequently, it is not
clear why, or even if, the Weimar Republic’s liberal position on women’s rights were
49
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rejected by women in favor of rights-limiting National Socialism. However, what is
known is that women were no more against National Socialism than men. In 1933,
columnist Mary Beard asked, “Why does she [German woman] vote for a group that
intends to take the ballot from her? Why does she support anti-feminism? How are we to
account for the fact that in nine cities where the sexes voted separately last autumn, more
women than men voted for the Nazis?”51 This is an interestingly question, but one
without a clear answer.
As historian Helen L. Boak contends:
Female emancipation was not one of the burning issues of the day, its
adherents few and their influence negligible. There was a noticeable
absence of feminist thought in Germany, and the dominant views on the
role of women in society were decidedly conservative, even among
women’s organizations. The economic problems of Weimar reinforced
this attitude. Women wished to hold on to their traditional role of wife and
mother, while the man was the provider, rather than to seek badly-paid
employment when their men were out of work.52
Boak goes on to insist that the Nazis’s stance on women—that they belong in their
traditional role of Kinder, Küche, Kirsche—was not offensive to women, rather, she
believes, they were inclined to embrace it. She states, “…in the light of women’s position
in Weimar society, the lack of feminist thought, the dominance of traditional views and
the similarity of the parties’ stances, it is questionable whether German women regarded
Nazi propaganda as anti-feminist; certainly they did not pay it much heed.”53
Furthermore, the “new woman” of the Weimar Republic was blamed by the Nazis as
being “…a symbol of degeneracy and modern ‘asphalt culture.’”54
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While it seems hasty to insist that women did not want rights, it is true that during
period of great upheaval, people are likely to return to what they know, rather than
pushing on toward something new. It may have felt safer for women to return to their
traditional role in the home during the period of economic upheaval, rather than forge
into new careers. Additionally, it is probably sensible to assume that the women’s
movement in Germany was neither all-encompassing enough or radical enough to stave
off the Nazis on its own; consequently, it is not remarkable that the women’s movement,
like so many other democratic movements in Germany, got swept up into National
Socialism.
However, this is not to say that feminists did not fight National Socialism. They
fought it head on until 1933, and as a result, feminists were viewed as a threat. In general,
the Nazis saw feminists and women’s organizations as “politically unreliable” groups,
and as such, they needed to be eliminated. While various groups mass action of all
ideologies remained active until 1933, the Gleichschaltung (co-ordination) was put into
effect when Hitler came to power.55
The Gleichschaltung had two stages. First, any organization that was seen as a
threat to National Socialism was dissolved; even mainstream organizations, such as the
BDF, were disbanded. While most former leaders of women’s organizations remained in
Germany, most radical feminists did not, many fled in 1933.56 Those organizations that
were not dissolved were incorporated into the Deutches Frauenwerk (German Women’s
Enterprise), or DFW, which was an umbrella organization for all non-Nazi women’s
organizations. Those organizations that remained intact were conservative women’s
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organizations, some of which were sympathetic to Hitler’s government because of its
hostility towards the left.57
In the second phase of the Gleichschaltung, those organizations that were directly
compatible with the DFW existed until its program was clarified; then, the original
organizations were dissolved into the DFW, with the DFW absorbing both their assets
and members. Those organizations that did not mesh with the DFW were dissolved, and
their members had the option of joining the DFW on their own, or choosing not to
participate in any organization.58 By the mid-1930s, the DFW had created a monopoly on
German women’s organizations.
In addition to the DFW, there was also the Nazi women’s organization, or the
National Socialist Frauenschaft, or NSF. This organization united the previously existing
charitable women’s organizations of Nazi party members.59 In the concept of Nazi
womanhood, women were expected to serve their communities, in addition to their
households, through the Nazi women’s organization.60 Within the NSF, female leaders
were always subordinate to men. Some women fought for autonomy within the
organization, and these women are sometimes referred to as “Nazi feminists.” However,
Stephenson rightly points out that this title is misleading, as these women were generally
unconcerned with more than gaining some authority within their own branch of the
National Socialist organization.61 Although feminism is a broad term, which includes
various social theories, political movements, and moral philosophies, for a movement to
be considered feminist, it must work to achieve progress for women and, in some way,
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work to reduce inequality between genders. “Nazi feminism” does not meet this threshold
because it accepted the philosophy that a women’s place is only in the home, the idea that
women should not hold any substantial political power, and that men, by right of birth,
are the dominate gender.
The leader of the NSF and DFW was Gertrud Scholtz-Klink, who was appointed
in February 1934. She is described as, “…the mother of a large family who could mouth
Nazi platitudes without saying much [else], she seemed the ideal public face for Nazi
womanhood.”62

Furthermore,

in

November

1934,

she

was

appointed

Reichsfrauenführerin (National Women’s Leader), a move which was described as,
“tactically clever…Scholtz-Klink remained in office as a useful instrument of the party
leadership through the end of the war.”63 Clearly, the Reichsfrauenführerin was not an
advocate for women’s rights and served mainly as a figurehead that allowed men in the
Nazi leadership easier access to German women.
The experience of individual women in Nazi Germany was centered on whether
or not they were considered to be of value to the Nazi party. As is commonly known,
Nazism had a particularly strong connection to race, and a woman’s worth to the party
was based on their ability to produce healthy, Aryan children. As assets to the party,
those women who could produce healthy, Aryan children received medals and money,
while those women who could not were often sterilized, as they were hindrances to Nazi
racial policy.64
In 1930, R.W. Darré, a Nazi blood and soil theorist, published Neuadel aus Blut
und Boden. His theories of racial hierarchy and his ideas on how they should be applied
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to women are emphasized in the book. The examination of the “classes of women,”
which he described in his 1930 book, provides insight into the formulation of Nazi policy
regarding women, race, and reproduction.
Class I: Included in this are those girls for whom marriage appears to be
desirable from every point of view. To ensure that only the really best are
gathered together in this class, an upper limit should be determined for
each age cohort with only a restricted percentage, perhaps 10 percent of
the numbers who are fully suitable for marriage, accepted into it.…
Class II: To this are assigned the remainder of all those girls who can
marry without there being any objections from the point of view of their
[potential] progeny. This class will generally be the most numerous, from
which reason the creation of two sub-classes, IIa and IIb, may be
considered.
Class III: To this are allocated those girls against whose marriage there are
no objections on moral or legal grounds, but whose hereditary value
requires that reproduction be prevented. These girls will be allowed to
marry once it can be guaranteed that their marriage will be childless.
Class IV: This comprises all those girls against whose marriage there are
fundamentally serious objections. Thus not only is it not desirable for
them to reproduce, but even their getting married must be opposed,
because it would demean the term German marriage. To this category
belong firstly all the mentally ill, as well as known prostitutes, whose
genealogy in any case predicts their trade, and in addition habitual
criminals etc.65
This passage is indicative of the relationship between race and gender that would
be born out of National Socialism. Frighteningly, very similar policies went into affect.
Under the Nazi government, some women had sterilization forced upon them, others
were denied the right to marry, and still others, who belonged to the least “desirable”
group, were placed into concentration camps or murdered.
While undesirable women faced forced sterilization, those women who were
considered especially valuable were placed under special control and provided with
special assistance. Valuable women were not allowed to have abortions in any case and
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were subject to particularly intensive pre-natal care. They were also afforded special
services, which included:
…advice on the possibility of economic assistance and the solution of
personal and family problems; material support and the possible payment
of a grant to cover the difference between earnings and maternity
benefit…convalescence leave or welfare up to the fifth month after birth
[in some cases]…[and] homes for single mothers.66
These special services for valuable women further demonstrate the connection between
the experiences of women in Nazi Germany and race.
Furthermore, the Nazis placed a strong emphasis on the value of Aryan women in
her role as the first educator of her children. She was expected to educate her children
“…to be both conscious of their racial identity and eager to engage in a life of service to
the ‘Aryan community.’”67 This role was viewed as particularly vital because mothers
had the earliest contact with their children, and consequently, were better suited than
anyone else to lay down a firm foundation of Nazi ideology in the minds of her
children.68
The cumulative effect of National Socialism on the lives of women was mixed.
National Socialism provided some unintended positive consequences. For example, it
gave women the opportunity, however unintentional, to work outside of the home due to
economic growth and military expansionism.69 Additionally, the Nazis created gender
segregated organizations, which, some believed, provided “space” for women “…to
empower themselves and to liberate themselves” from their traditional roles.70 Of course,
Nazism had a variety of much more negative impacts as well. The special role that racism
66
67
68
69
70

Stephenson, Women in Nazi Germany
ibid., 18
ibid., 19
ibid., 4
ibid., 4
26

played in National Socialism had a particularly profound effect on women; women, as the
reproducers of human beings, were the focus of special attention and pressure in regards
to this special skill.71 Furthermore, although women were expected to be submissive to
men in nearly all aspects of Nazi society, they were sometimes condemned as coconspirators in the atrocities committed by their husbands.72
Still, when it comes to women’s rights, there is little argument about the years in
which Germany was a Nazi dictatorship. They were not happy years for Germans, either
male or female. All Germans had their personal liberties severely curtailed by the Nazi
government. Unquestionably, fascism did not present a set of circumstances under which
any democratic movement flourished, including the women’s rights movement. The
period was an overall setback for those committed to political progress. Furthermore, in
the immediate post-war years, essentially no women’s movement existed, as Germans
were concerned, primarily, with survival. Desperate circumstances do not lend
themselves to anything beyond what it immediately necessary.
However, by 1949, the situation in Germany had improved substantially since the
end of the war. By this point, it was clear that there would be a split between those zones
governed by the British, French, and Americans, and the zone ruled by the Soviet
Union—this formed the divide between East and West Germany.
Federal Republic of Germany
By 1949, West Germans had begun to concern themselves with writing a new
constitution. At this time, activist women, who had not been involved in public life since
1933, remerged to give their input on the new constitution. Women were concerned that
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they would once again be left out of the public sphere, despite having played a crucial
role in holding together the family during the war, and helping to rebuild after the war.
Furthermore, women believed that their endurance during the Nazi era and immediate
post-war years entitled them to equality.73
Elisabeth Selbert, a veteran of the pre-war women socialist movement and an
SPD representative, led the movement for guaranteed equality under the law. She
mobilized other women’s rights activists, whom she had worked with before the war, in
order to make the case. Still, Selbert did not intend to undermine the traditional roles of
men and women in German society—she believed that a women’s natural calling was to
motherhood and homemaking—but, she also believed that women’s work within the
home should be considered as valuable as paid employment.74
Selbert and her cohorts prevailed, and the new constitution, which became known
as the Grundgesetz, or Basic Law contained Article 3, guaranteed equal rights under the
law for all people. It reads:
Article 3 (Equality before the law).
1. All persons are equal before the law.
2. Men and women have equal rights.
3. No one may be prejudiced or favored because of his sex, his parentage, his
race, his language, his homeland and origin, his faith or his religious or
political opinions.75
Furthermore, the German Civil Code, which had not been significantly changed since
1900, was to be revised by 1953 in order to remove those pieces that did not comply with
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equality before the law, especially in the areas of marriage and family law. Unfortunately,
this did not occur as planned.
Initially, legislators did not interpret the Basic Law as women had hoped; instead
of gaining rights, they lost some. For example, legislators interpreted equality under the
law to mean that women were not entitled to receive maintenance payments in divorce
settlements.76 Economic and social rights enjoyed by men were also not extended to
women. However, in 1953, the situation began to change when the Federal Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht (BverfG)),

issued a ruling that reasserted the

commitment of the Basic Law to equality, while simultaneously reinforcing that Article 3
did not invalidate traditional roles. As a result, in March 1953, those sections of the Civil
Code that regulated women, family, and martial law were suspended, as the government
had yet to make the appropriate changes. Suspension of the Civil Code has been
suggested in 1949, but the suggestion was dismissed on the grounds that legislators
believed it would create a chaotic situation. To the surprise of conservative politicians,
between 1953 and 1958, when the Civil Code was finally changed, chaos did not reign in
areas of family and marital law. Instead, the break in the Civil Code allowed for the
readjustment of social norms by judges, which, in turn, gave women more rights than
they had previously been afforded in these areas.77
The Bundestag agreed on updated legislation in 1957 and came into effect in
1958. The new laws focused on providing women with equal rights in those areas where
the rights of men and women meet directly. For example, important changes included:
women were entitled to work outside the home without the permission of their husbands;
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the property and possessions obtained during a married were no longer the exclusive
property of the man.78 Furthermore, in 1959, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that
both parents had custodial and decision-making rights regarding their children;
previously, fathers had exclusive rights.79 This change in the Civil Code established the
concept of the “housewife-marriage” as the ideal.
In West Germany, the women’s movement was not a potent political force in the
post-war years, mainly because an active, public women’s movement did not exist. As
noted above, gender relations based on a “traditional” model characterized the post-war
decades. Essentially, the only idea of womanhood that existed was the married,
nonworking mother, Teresa Kulawik argues, “…women as political subjects did not
exist.”80 West Germans saw the women’s movement as a cultural, rather than a political
movement, and generally, the labor movement, with its close ties to political parties, was
the West German social movement of choice into the 1980s.81 Furthermore, in West
Germany, citizenship was closely tied to “the market and the male laborer.” Kulawik
argues that a strong correlation existed between institutional class conflict and social
policies, which has meant that the political constituencies of Germany owe their
allegiances first to class, and then to everything else. Consequently, she believes that this
close relationship between “economic achievement” and political legitimacy” and
combination with the traditional role of women, made it difficult for a feminist movement
82
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Nevertheless, the 1960s gave way to a generation of women who were better
educated and more integrated into the workforce due “the economic miracle”
(Wirtschaftwunder) that led to the need for a better educated workforce. This new
generation “…demanded more than merely formal democratic rights.”83 In 1973, the first
women’s center opened in Berlin and the body of feminist literature was rising. Authors
Gisela Elsner, Ingeborg Drewitz, Gabriele Wohmann, Karin Struck and Verna Stefan all
wrote novels that deal with female sexuality and relationships.84 Cafés, academic journals,
calendars, publishing houses, and bookstores were opened between 1975 and 1980 as part
of the women’s counterculture movement.85 Furthermore, following the British model,
several Frauenhäuser, shelters for battered women, opened their doors in the late-1970s
and early-1908s to victims of domestic violence.86 The 1970s brought several significant
changes for women from several different directions. Also, the abortion rights movement
led to an increase in activism.
The late 1970s brought increased antidiscrimination laws into the workplace;
however, the motivation came from an external force. Although a separate pay structure
for women had been deemed unconstitutional in 1955, women continued to be assigned
87
to Leichtlohngruppen, or lower wage groups, by industry. This practice continued until

the late 1970s, when the European Commission challenged the German practice under
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Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, which states, “…women are to receive the same rates
of pay as men and that pay should be linked to the place and type of work, not gender.”88
At first, the German government, with their close ties to industry, did not believe
that the directives issued by the Commission regarding Article 119 applied to them; they
felt their laws were adequate. However, they were wrong, and on May 10, 1979 the
European Court of Justice began a breach of treaty procedure against West Germany.
West Germany responded with the EG Anpassungsgesetz, or Labor Law to Comply with
the European Community Provisions, which came into law in August 1980. There are
three important sections: §611a and §611b concern the equal treatment of men and
women. They require that men and women be treated equally in all aspects of
appointment, promotion, and dismissal. In the case of a dispute, the employer must prove
that discrimination did not occur. Also, discrimination in hiring is not allowed. §612b
requires the equal payment of men and women in the spirit of Treaty of Rome Article
89
119. However, there are problems with the enforcement of this law, which still exists

today.
A mass women’s movement emerged in 1971 with a strong focus on abortion
rights for women. As a uniquely women’s issue, abortion gave West German women the
motivation they needed to stand up and be counted. The pro-choice movement was
constituted of women’s groups, demonstrations, and national conferences. However, the
failure of the abortion campaign with the Constitutional Court ruling in 1975 that
abortions were illegal under the German constitution, reaffirmed the feminist belief that
the state “…was an apparatus of male control and domination,” which, in turn, led to a
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general loss of faith in government and politics and a rejection of the institutions that
represented them.90
Furthermore, the concept of the “housewife-marriage,” which was opposed by
feminists, remained firmly in place until 1977, when the government was taken over by
an SPD-FDP coalition, which did away with the “housewife-marriage” in favor of an
equal partnership model. This new legislation required married couples to agree on
managing the household, allowed both partners to take on paid employment, stated that
both partners, not just the woman, were responsible for the upkeep of the family, and
furthermore, that running the family was as much of a contribution to the family as
earning an income. This legislation also substantially changed divorce law by introducing
the concept of the “no fault” divorce. Until this point, all divorces required a “guilty”
party. Additionally, the 1977 law entitled women to their share of mutual property, even
91
if she left the family home. Despite the law, some judges, who were primarily male,

withheld maintenance payments to women whom the judges believed had acted “without
any exterior cause from pure willfulness,” or to women whom had moved in with another
92
man immediately after leaving the family home. This new legislation was important

because it challenged the accepted gender role structure for the first time; husbands no
longer had legal power over their wives. This legislation rejected the notion that the
patriarchal family model was the only socially acceptable family model. However,
effectively, this legislature brought the law up-to-date with the current situation in
Germany. For example, by the late 1970s, before “no fault” divorce became part of
German law, most divorcing couples simply agreed to assign blame to one party in order
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to obtain a divorce. Most Germans were acting under the equal partnership model before
it became law.
Still, the West German women’s movement moved out of the public sphere after
the 1975 Constitutional Court decision. This was partially due feminist’s disenchantment
with the failure of the abortion campaign, but several other factors affected the situation
as well. Problematically, the movement that emerged in the early 1970s was met with
hostility by the government. Even parties that supported women’s issues, like the SPD,
refused to include “libbers” in their own organizations; Teresa Kulawik characterizes the
government as “repressive and exclusive,” despite the apparent openness of the federal
system.93 Additionally, terrorist acts by the Baader-Meinhof gang in the late 1970s,
“…created a public climate of instigation against intellectuals, left-wing activists and
feminists.”94 The movement went underground, and focused on creating a
“countersociety.” There were three primary features to the ideology of their
countersociety, which were: (1) autonomy: the movement strove to challenge established
political institutions; (2) subjectivity: they attempted to “politicize loci of domination”
that were previously considered private; (3) patriarchy: they attempted to developed an
understanding of gender relations wherein gender inequalities were to be seen as a result
of “an institutional gender domination.”95
As the 1980s approached, the situation improved and feminists began to move
back into the public sphere. In the early 1980s, the Gleichstellungsstellen (Office for
Women’s Rights) was established. In the mid-1980s, the movement moved away from
“autonomous feminism” towards “established feminism”; in other words, feminists no
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longer attempted to create a counter-society movement, but were again willing to work
with the established institutional structure.96 In the 1980s, women’s movements began to
move back into politics; they set their sights on the Green Party (founded 1979), which
was known for its liberal social policy. In 1982, the Greens held twenty-seven seats in the
Bundestag, ten of which were held by women.97 After the initial acceptance of women by
the Greens, other parties were forced to incorporate women into their political programs;
the CDU held a Women’s Congress in 1985, and the SPD emphasized its acceptance of
feminist politics.98 Women became more active in politics in the late 1980s, with women
making up 50 percent of the Berlin Länder government; also, in 1988, the SPD agreed to
a quota of 40 percent, which meant that all of their committees, functions, and delegates
99
had to be at least 40 percent female. Kulawik writes, “[By the late 1980s feminism had]

established a collective identity, carrying feminist issues to almost all social and political
places. …[The movement] turned increasingly to strategies that challenged political
power and decision structures.”

100

German Democratic Republic
The political and social situation of women in the GDR differed in many ways
from that of FRG women. For example, GDR women did not need to fight for equal
protection under the law. Full equality was granted to them in article 20.2 of the
Constitution, which states that women and men are equal before the law and emphasizes
the importance of the advancement of women as producers, making it the duty of society
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and the state to advance women.101 However, gender differences remained apparent in
East German, as women with in the society were expected to shoulder the double burden
of both worker and wife/mother.
East Germany was, arguably, the most individually repressive state in the Eastern
Bloc; as a result, no traditional-style women’s movement existed in the East, as it would
have been rapidly suppressed by the state. However, this does not mean that the GDR
was devoid of any sense of feminist or of gender-related, issue-oriented movements.
The GDR produced at least two well-known female novelists. Christa Wolf, the most
well known, wrote a number of novels read widely both inside and outside of the GDR,
before and after unification. While the central theme of her writing is childhood, and she
was not deliberately feminist in her writing, her books still portray the voice of women in
the GDR. Kassandra (1983), her most famous work, allegorically “re-interprets the battle
of Troy as a war for economic power and a shift from a matriarchal to patriarchal
society.”
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Irmtraud Morgner, the GDR’s most deliberately feminist author, wrote books

which combine “the life of a female troubadour with modern life and science fiction
events.”103 During and after the unification period, she wrote several articles for German
women’s magazines on the topic of feminism.
The GDR’s most significant gender-related movement was not linked specifically
to feminist, but to sexuality. In the late 1980s, a number of issued-oriented movements
grew out of the Evangelical church in the GDR that spread into party and state
institutions. Among these movements, was a prominent gay and lesbian movement. This
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movement was able to exist due to a shift in SED party ideology in the 1970s that began
to recognize the importance of individual and personal development as aspects of
socialism. Initially, the SED promoted “unalienated labor” as the solution; however, in
the early 1980s, they changed course, and, upon re-evaluation of the early writing of
Marx, determined that “self-actualization could now be realized not only through labor,
but also through social and cultural aspects of life.”104
In 1985, the GDR began a campaign to end discrimination the basis of sexual and
emotional orientation. The state worked to develop “…structures that could support
citizens in the personal process of defining their sexual identity…” while allowing the
state to provide direction an as aspect of social change.105 It should be noted that this level
of openness about gays and lesbians was unique to the GDR—no other Eastern Bloc
country began to approach this level of openness about sexuality. There are many factors
that may have contributed to this uniqueness. First, the lack of religious hardliners in the
GDR (unlike in many other Eastern states, which were Catholic or Eastern Orthodox.)
Secondly, the consist exposure of GDR citizens to Western media, particularly television.
In Out of the Closet Behind the Wall, Raelynn J. Hillhouse argues this connection
between East and West Germany forced the GDR to take into account developments in
the West. During the 1970s and 1980s, gay and lesbian subcultures developed in the
West, which allowed gays and lesbians to live in relative freedom. This prompted gays
and lesbians in the GDR to apply for emigration. By ignoring the needs of 700,000800,000 gay and lesbian citizens in the GDR, the government was only worsening its
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already significant emigration 106 Thirdly, the discovery of AIDS in the early 1980s, with
its link to sexual activity among gay men, made homosexuality hard to ignore. In 1983,
the ministry of health in the GDR created an advisory group on AIDS to formulate public
policy, which led to the creation of AIDS counseling centers, universal blood and organ
donor testing, and AIDS wards in three Berlin hospitals, all in 1985. In 1987, a media
campaign was mounted to provide the public with information on AIDS. Additionally,
attempts were mad to mitigate high-risk behavior among gay men.
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Furthermore, the lack of a strong, independent feminist movement led to the lack
of a divide between gay and lesbian movements—both worked together under
predominately gay organizations. Until 1987, no independent lesbian groups existed, and
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even once they did, there numbers remained limited.

The sexuality-based gender

movement in the GDR was important to all marginalized groups, as it was “the first
social movement to successfully pressure the GDR government to accommodate its
demands….”
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It is impossible to say whether a feminist movement would have grown

out of the gay and lesbian movement, as the Wall fell. Still, the gay and lesbian
movement is an important movement within the realm of gender in itself.
Reframing the Debate
The merging of the FRG and the GDR initiated a renewed discussion of feminism
within Germany. At this moment, another group of previously marginalized feminists
stepped in and added their unique position to the debate; this group was the lesbian
feminists. Early in the unification process (December 1989), Emma wrote an article
about lesbian feminists, calling on University of Massachusetts professor Janice G.
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Raymond to help explain what lesbians can add to feminism. The article, titled,
“Lesben…nur von der Taille abwärts?” (“Lesbian…only from the waist down?”),
explains that lesbian feminism stands in opposition to traditional feminism. Raymond
explains:
The feminist movement was the largest challenge to hetero-reality. It
questioned the worldview that women exist primarily in relationship to
men. It examined the history of women as a history, which showed up
particularly in the family—a history, which if it saw women at all,
discussed women in their relationships to men and their role in maledetermined events.110
Raymond explains that lesbian feminism differs in that:
Lesbian feminism was a movement that relied on the strength of “we”,
not on the fantasy or style of an individual woman. It was a movement that
had its own policy—it understood prostitution, Pornography and sexual
desire not as therapeutic, economic, or sexy, but allowed them to be
redefined as only a list—free options—that can correspond to the whim of
an individual woman.111
In other words, lesbian feminism challenges the traditional context of feminism, seeing
women as independent from men. Raymond argues that lesbian feminism is able to
accomplish this separation between men and women more effectively, as sex is not only a
110
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biological impulse, but a social driving force, and that the sexuality of straight women
forces them into a position with men from which lesbians are free. She believes,
Sex, originally a biological impulse, now appears as the original social
engine, which provides fulfillment by using all male power forms of
sexual reification, subordination and suppression. Just as all engines need
repairs and [new] technology, so does sex.112
Raymond’s vision of a feminism that exists independently of male contextualization,
obviously, was not achieved by the end of the unification period—fifteen years after
unification, it is still a long way off. However, the importance of lesbian feminism as a
part of the feminist spectrum during unification and afterwards, is that it provides a
different perspective. A perspective, it seem, which is particularly important in a society
with such deeply patriarchal roots. The idea of an independent feminist encourages
women to look beyond that model, to a place beyond mere equality.

The face of German feminism has changed considerably over the course of the
last one hundred fifty years; the ever-changing terrain of the German political system and
the events that have characterized the last century and a half have punctuated women’s
social and political movements. Until unification in the early 1990s, feminism was
constrained by a cult of domesticity, which tied the identity of women to the home. It was
not until the GDR challenged the existing model that the women of the FRG began to
truly cut their ties to the home and move into the workforce. This move away from
domesticity has led to a reassessment of the childcare system within Germany, as well as
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prompted a discussion over traditionally established gender divisions in the
responsibilities of housework, childcare, and income earning. Furthermore, the more
progressive social policies of the GDR, particularly concerning abortion, allowed
unification to become an opportunity to renew the fight for access to abortions in
Germany. In fact, the right to choose became the central women’s question in the
unification debate; it came to be the representative women’s issue.
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Chapter 2: Die Frauenfrage
The women’s issue that has stood at the forefront of the post-feminist period
Western world is, undoubtedly, abortion. It is not surprising that the question of a
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy has found itself at the center of post-suffrage
women’s movement. Unlike suffrage, equal treatment under the law, and equal
opportunity in employment, there is no male equivalent to pregnancy. Notably, many of
the signs carried to protest the law limiting abortion in the Federal Republic of Germany
stated, “If men could get pregnant, they never would have given us §218.”113 Pregnancy
is uniquely female condition, and it follows that the question over the right to terminate it
has become a question to which women have a unique relationship. Consequently, it is
not surprising that the abortion question became unification’s Frauenfrage, or women’s
question.
Additionally, abortion found itself at the center of the abortion debate due to its
particular circumstances; the laws governing abortion differed in the Federal Republic
and the German Democratic Republic. As a result, women in both Germanys saw
unification as an opportunity to ensure that legal abortions would be available in united
Germany. Prior to unification, abortions were legal into the GDR during the first three
months of pregnancy; in the FRG abortions were technically illegal, the only legal
grounds for an abortion were if the pregnancy posed a significant health risk to the
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mother. However, many abortions were obtained either illegally within Germany or by
travel to the neighboring Netherlands, where an abortion could be obtained legally.
The GDR policy on abortion, which allowed for abortions on demand until three
months of pregnancy, came into law in 1972. This liberal abortion code, technically
known as §153, was commonly referred to as Fristenlösung.114 While it is difficult to
translate Fristenlösung directly, it is best defined as the solution of setting a deadline, or
prescribing a period of time, in which an abortion can occur. The FRG policy, which
came into law in 1976, was the result of a decision by the Federal Constitution Court of
Germany in 1975. The Court ruled that abortions violated the right to life of the unborn,
thus making them “an act of killing.”115 The 1976 law legalized abortion until the twelfth
week “for reasons of medical necessity, sexual crimes or serious social or emotional
distress.”116 The law required approval of the procedure by two doctors, counseling, and
a three-day waiting period.117 This policy became known as §218, for its place in the
West German Basic Law.
The focal point in the abortion debate was whether or not united Germany should
adopt the more progressive abortion policy of the GDR, or if the FRG policy should
remain in place. The issue, deemed the Frauenfrage, or “women’s question,” by the
press, led to a dispute that raged on everywhere, from the pages of women’s magazines to
the Bundestag.
Women in both the FRG and the GDR felt a close connection to the abortion
question. The discussion that unfolded around abortion found itself a home in the pages
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of women’s magazines. During the unification period, there were three major types of
articles that dealt with the Frauenfrage in Für Dich and Emma—informative, discussion
and opinion. Informative articles were concerned with providing readers with information
that would allow them to both develop an informed stance on the issue and to understand
how the debate was taking shape around them. The topics of these articles ranged from
telling the history of abortion, both political and social, to providing information on the
positions taken on the abortion question by the various political parties.
An excellent example of an informative article appeared in the pages of Für Dich.
The article, titled, “Teufelstränke und Engelmacherinnen,”118 which translates as “devil’s
drink and angel makers,” discusses the history of abortion in Germany over the last 200
years. The article points out that abortion is not a product of the 20th century, but rather,
that abortions and attempts at birth control have been used for hundreds of years or more.
The article not only discusses methods of abortions, but also reviews the development of
birth control, including the condom and the birth control pill. The article emphasizes that
the ability to control pregnancy has reduced the birth rate, which has allowed for the
emancipation of women and has separated sexuality from reproduction. Overall, the
article focuses on the argument that the right to control one’s own body—including the
right to an abortion—is a critical part of women’s freedom and equality.119 This type of
article provided women with pertinent background information on the abortion question,
and additionally, emphasized the importance of maintaining the right to a legal abortion.
Furthermore, it gives reasons as to why the right to a legal abortion is a right worth the
fight.
118

Stephanie Stender, "Teufelstränke Und Engelmacherinne," Für Dich, Week 32/1990,
1990, 52-55.
119
ibid.52-55
44

Emma also had various informative articles, one such article titled, “§218 VOR
DEM FALL” or “The Case of §218,” argues that §218 should be resubmitted to the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, or Federal Constitution Court, for examination.120 In the
article, female leaders from the major political parties are asked to give their opinions on
§218. Each politician expresses her party’s stance on the issue, as well as the reasons for
their position.121 This article provided German women with information in regards to the
abortion question from Germany’s major political parties, which would have helped them
to make informed decisions when choosing elected leaders.
Discussion articles were primarily concerned with addressing how the abortion
question affected the day-to-day lives of German women. These articles ask questions
about the consequences a change in the abortion law would have on women from both
the GDR and the FRG. Discussion articles encouraged women to reflect on how their life
would be affected if they became unintentionally pregnant and what repercussions a
decision on the legality of abortion would have on them. Furthermore, these articles
provided women with insight into why individual women chose to have abortions; these
articles were especially important because they allowed women who had never been
faced with the decision of whether or not to have an abortion to develop a connection to
the issue, even if it might never affect them personally.
In excellent discussion article appeared in Für Dich, the article, published in mid1990, which is titled, “A Child? In these times?” discusses why women choose to have
abortions. 122 For the article, the reporter interviewed a patient, a gynecologist, a ministry
of health employee and a Catholic counselor. The main argument of this article is that
120
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women do not want to have more children than they can adequately care for, and,
consequently, if the social conditions are such that women are more able to care for their
children, then they will be less likely to have abortions. This East German article cites
statistics that show fewer abortions occurring in the 1980s (about 10%), when conditions
in the GDR were generally considered to have improved. This article maintains that it is
the responsibility of the society to support mothers and children, and that it is society’s
failures, not the failure of individual women, which lead to abortions. Consequently, the
article maintains, “ ‘Yes or no’ is the decision of the woman alone.”123 This article
provides a perspective on the abortion question that is of unique interest to women living
under the socialist system in the GDR; in the context of unification, this article would
have seemed very reasonable to East German women, who were concerned not only by
the possibly of losing their right to a legal abortion, but also by the possibility of losing
the socialist structure that provided them with family supports like free daycare and paid
maternity leave. This article addresses the importance of preserving the right to an
abortion in a society faced with uncertainty and upheaval.
The third type of article focused on collecting the opinions on the abortion
question from individual women from both sides of the divide. These opinion articles,
which packed the pages of both Für Dich and Emma, made sure to include the opinions
of women from the “other” Germany to share with there readers. These articles were
important because they allowed women who had little chance of meeting to openly
discuss their individual thoughts and feelings on this important question. These
magazines provided a forum for countrywide debate within their pages, a debate that
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would have been difficult for so many different women from various backgrounds to
participate in elsewhere.
In a Für Dich article, “Abbruch-Tabu” (“Abort Taboo), from July 1990, an East
German woman, Gabriele M. Grafenhorst, discusses the reason she changed her mind
about abortions.124 She recalls being a young woman in East Berlin, shortly after the Wall
fell. She had two young daughters from two different fathers; one of the girls had severe
asthma. She fell in love with a West German man, who she believed would be her
salvation. She became pregnant, but then found out that he was married. She realized that
she could not financially support another child, and, in her despair, she considered
suicide. Although she had never considered an abortion previously, she knew she had no
other choice. She wrote:
I have always been of the opinion that no women should be allowed to
have an abortion. That was one of the reasons why I had Susan. I wanted
to have Susan against all reason. I kept that I was pregnant quiet from my
friends and her father until12 weeks—it was predicted that we could not
live with one another It would not have been possible for anybody to
convince me to have an abortion. I don’t know to what extent my
objection to it is religious. If anything [I objected] for ethical reasons.
Surely it also has to do, somewhat, with the fact that I grew up in a
Christian household.125
The importance of this opinion piece is Grafenhorst’s change in opinion. It exemplifies
the idea that it is impossible to predict the situations that one might end up in, and for that
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reason, it is critical to keep all options open. Before this experience, Grafenhorst had
never considered an abortion, but she realized that she and her existing children would be
exponentially more better off if she did not have a third child. The article propagates a
message seen through Für Dich and Emma during the period, which is that women
should fight for the right to legal abortions, even if they never considered one themselves,
because it is impossible to know what set of circumstances could arise that would lead to
a decision that one would not have previously considered.
Alice Schwarzer, editor-in-chief of Emma, became particularly prolific during the
unification period. Nearly every month, Schwarzer wrote an article that spoke of the
importance of legal abortion in unified Germany. She also conducted several interviews
with well-known German intellectuals to solicit their opinion of §218. One such
interview appeared in April 1990; in the interview, Schwarzer asks Professor Albin Eser,
co-author of the study, “Abortion in International Relations” and director of the Max
Planck Institute for International Criminal Law for his opinion on how the conflict over
the abortion question will be resolved.126 At the time when Professor Eser was
interviewed (early in 1990, the article was published in April 1990), there were a lot of
unknowns surrounding unification, particularly in regards to the abortion question. One
issue that was raised early in the period was whether or not it would be possible for the
former eastern states and former western states to maintain separate abortion laws. This
particular question was addressed to Professor Eser. He responded that it would be
impossible for Germany to maintain two separate laws in regards to abortion as a country
cannot have two separate policies about abortion when the fundamental issue is the
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protection of unborn lives; in other words, unborn lives cannot be protected in one half of
the country and not in the other, as that is illogical.127 Fifteen years after unification, with
the decision long since decided, it may seem arbitrary to discuss whether or not two
abortion policies would be maintained in Germany; however, at the time the interview
occurred, this was a pressing question in the unification debate, as it was representative of
all women’s issues. Ms. Schwarzer’s interview with Professor Eser helped to establish
that German women needed to unite against §218, as there would be no intermediate
solution. These expert interviews helped women to understand the situation surrounding
the Frauenfrage, and consequently, allow women to determine how they should react to
the situation.
Additionally, both magazines featured sections in which women were encouraged
to share their opinion on §218. Emma featured a section titled, “Deutsch-Deutsch”.128 In
this section, editorials written by both Eastern and Western women were published, so
that women in both Germanys could understand the opinions of their counterparts. On the
topic of §218, an East German woman, Ursula Richter-Höhnerbach, wrote:
[The women of my collective] are speechless over the discussion
surrounding §218. No woman here would let herself be talked into the
decision [not to have an abortion], neither by a bishop, or politician, nor
by any man. With all this quarrelling about “unborn lives” we fail to have
consideration for “born lives!” No woman wants it to be different [from
Fristenlösung] ever again!129
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In her letter, Richter-Höhnerbach clearly expresses her opinion about §218, and
without the forum provided by Emma, her opinion probably would have reached few
West German women.
In June of 1990, Emma published the aforementioned article, “§218 VOR DEM
FALL?” This article, while clearly opposing §218, provides interesting insight into the
opinions of each major political party regarding abortion. The first politician interviewed
in the article is the chairwoman of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Irmgard AdamSchwätzer.130 The FDP is best described as Germany’s free-market classical liberal party.
The party is centrist to slightly right of center, although it does have a strong social
liberal wing. They believe in a free market economy and a limited centralized
government. The party’s motto is “as much government as needed, as little government
as possible.” The party members tend to be made up of “middle-to-upper class
Protestants who consider themselves ‘independents’ and heirs to the European liberal
tradition.”131 The party traditionally garners between 5.8 and 12.8% of the vote, but
despite this fact, it has played an important role in post-war German politics, as it has
participated in all but three federal governments.132 In the 11th Bundestag from 19871990, the FDP held 46 out of 497 seats, and in the 12th Bundestag from 1990-1994, it
held 79 of the 662 seats.133 In 1990, the East German Association of Free Democrats was
absorbed by the FDP.
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In the article, Adam-Schwätzer states that she believes constitutional challenges
to §218 have “quite good chances” in the Federal Constitution Court, and that “The
Federal Republic [of Germany] should adopt the liberal [abortion] rights of the GDR.”134
The article states that all of the women in the FDP stand behind Adam-Schwätzer and, if
the complaint against §218 should fail in the Constitutional Court, the FDP will find a
solution to the problem.135 Emma summarizes Adam-Schwätzer’s argument categorically
with the statement, “Therefore die Fristenlösung for all German women.”
The second politician to be interviewed in the article is Renate Schmidt, the lead
woman in the Social Democratic Party or the SPD.136 The party, while still technically
socialist, moved away from its roots as a class party with Marxist principles in the 1959
Godesberg Program, since then, the SPD has developed into a party that champions
social welfare programs. The SPD began as the opposition party after World War II, but
developed into a leader in German politics. The party led the federal government from
1969 to 1982, and again from 1998-2005 under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. In the
GDR, the Social Democratic Party was forced to merge with the Communist Party of
Germany. During the unification period, the SPD was again established in the GDR, and
the GDR section of the SPD merged with its FRG counterpart upon reunification.137 In
the 11th Bundestag, the SPD held 186 of the 497 seats, and in the 12th Bundestag, it held
239 of the 662 seats.
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In “§218 VOR DEM FALL?” Renate Schmidt asserts, “In a United Germany,
abortion must be allowed for all women, as it is today in the GDR.”138 The article also
notes that Gerhard Schröder, who was the leading candidate for the SPD in North Saxony
at the time, and who later went on to become chancellor, was in favor of Fristenlösung as
the abortion policy for a united Germany.139 At the time of the publication of this article,
the SPD had not yet merged with its East German counterpart; consequently, the Emma
article includes a statement from the social democratic workers women (AsF), who
argued that women have a right to “self-determination,” advocated not only the removal
of §218, but a lengthening of the period in which a woman could legally receive in
abortion from three months to five months.140 While the position of the Eastern social
democratic women might be considered somewhat radical, the article clearly
demonstrates that both arms of the SPD wished to have §218 removed from the Federal
Constitution and replaced with a policy more similar to the GDR’s Fristenlösung.
At this point, the article goes on the offensive, and presents the opinions of those
who are in favor of maintaining §218, while at the same time, attempting to undermine
their opinions to some degree. The party that is attacked most thoroughly is the Christian
Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU).141 This is not surprising, as the
CDU/CSU is both one of the largest parties in Germany and also the most conservative of
the mainstream political parties. The CDU/CSU are sister parties; the CSU operates only
in Bavaria, where the CDU does not exist, and the CDU operates in the rest of the
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country. Members of the CDU/CSU come from various economic backgrounds and the
party is tied more closely to the Roman Catholic Church than any other German party.
Consequently, the CSU plays a considerable role in “The Union” even though it operates
in only Bavaria, as most of Bavaria is Catholic. “The Union” is generally more
conservative both economically and socially than Germany’s other major parties, and it
supports a social-market economy.142 “The CDU believes that mankind has a
responsibility to God in upholding the Christian ideals and caring for the environment.
Parts of these beliefs include supporting the freedom and dignity of all persons including
equal rights among women, men, and the disabled.”143 The CDU/CSU was the leading
federal party through much of the 1980s and 1990s, including during the entire
unification period, from 1982 to 1998 CDU leader Helmut Kohl held the chancellorship.
In the 11th Bundestag, the CDU/CSU held 223 of the 497 seats, and in the 12th
Bundestag, the CDU/CSU held 319 of the 662 seats.144 In 1990, the CDU merged with its
Eastern counterpart of the same name.145 The majority in the Bundestag in combination
with the chancellorship, which gave the CDU/CSU the majority of government power,
played a significant role in Emma’s attempts to undermine the party in its pages.
In the article, Emma first establishes that the CDU/CSU opposes the removal of
§218 in favor of a more liberal abortion policy. Emma’s tone is both accusatory and
aggressive in describing the actions and motivations of the CDU/CSU:
There is in fact a good chance that reunification will bring back, also for
the FRG, the Fristenlösung we were robbed of in 1975. Conservatives
know that. And because of this their tone always becomes shriller around
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the subject of abortion. At least in the West. The constitutional challenge
of the CSU state government in Bavaria for strengthening of the
prohibition of abortion can only be understood in this context.146
After establishing the position of the CDU/CSU, Emma states that the female members of
the CDU/CSU should be embarrassed by their stance, as they are not only politicians, but
also women.147 Kohl’s Bundestag president, Rita Süssmuth, is quoted as saying:
We have not satisfactorily solved the protection of unborn lives and the
conflicts of women in the FRG nor in the GDR…Here it is necessary to
collectively find a new way out of a dead end. …There are also powerful
forces in the GDR that find their regulations too liberal.148
Emma accuses Süssman of trying to put mandatory counseling in place before a woman
can have an abortion, which Emma believes is effectively a way to put a “quasi-§218”
into place.149
The article continues in the vain of most vigilant political campaigns, and it is a
classic example of the Emma articles about §218 that were published during the
unification period. The campaign portion of the article begins with a call to action, “We
women in the West and East (and also, understanding men) must make our demands
NOW. This is our last chance for a longtime.”150 This particular sentence is reminiscent
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of the shouting often heard at rallies, “What do we want? (Insert demand here.) When do
we want it? NOW!” This demonstrates that German women were fighting for the right to
have an abortion, not just passively entertaining the prospects of it.
Emma goes on to attempt to undermine the arguments of those in favor of §218.
Emma supports its anti-§218 stance by noting that in the GDR, which had the policy of
Fristenlösung for more than fifteen years at the time of unification, all parties, including
the East German branch of the CDU, supported the policy of legal abortion up to three
months. “Presently, in the GDR, all parties are still against §218 and for Fristenlösung.
The CDU is also for it.”151 Furthermore, Emma points out that the GDR government
intends to defend its policy in the German unification negotiations. However, Emma also
notes that “the front of conservative abortion proponents” was already beginning to
crumble.152
One major argument use by opponents of Fristenlösung was that if abortion were
made legal, women would abuse the right by having abortions all the time. Emma latched
onto this particular argument. The magazine remarked that one East German CDU
delegate, Eckard Altmann, spoke of “heavy abuse” of the Fristenlösung in Parliament, as
he believes that one in four pregnancies ending in abortion is too many.153 Emma
retaliates to these arguments in a unique way; it claims that anti-abortion regulations are a
thing of the past, and it insists that united Germany must adapt to modern ideals, instead
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of clinging to the past. In support of the argument that legalized abortion is the way of the
future, Emma points to anti-abortion advocates around the world as evidence.
Also, the magazine cites a Polish citizen, Lech Walesa, who later became the
president of Poland, (at the time, seven out of one-hundred pregnancies in Poland ended
in abortion), and who is a father of eight children. He believes that life begins at the
moment of conception.154 He is referred to as “a friend of the Pope” and a “Solidarnosc”
at the end of his statement, Emma writes, “The Polish Revolution lives!” Emma also
refers to a “Stop-Killing-Babies-Fanatic” in the U.S. who sent up a hot air balloon in
front of the White House with a large photo of a fetus on it that read, “Abortion is a
human tragedy.”155 This effort is characterized as a last ditch effort for the anti-abortion
movement. Finally, Emma cites the rest of Western Europe; it points out that besides the
FRG, only Ireland and Spain have laws prohibiting abortion.156 The magazine comments
that the Strasbourg Parliament recently called for “a European-wide right to an abortion”
and it further notes that the European Parliament recently criticized countries with antiabortion laws.157
At first glance, Emma’s argument that anti-abortion laws were things of the past
may seem based more in desperation than in reality. However, a more throughout
examination reveals that as the regard for a women’s right to self-determination
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increases, which often coincides with a rise in awareness for women’s issues, abortion
prohibitions tend to be lifted. Whether or not the right to a legal abortion exists within a
country stands as a clear marker for the level of social and political rights women within
that country have achieved. According to socialist doctrine, their ties to the home limit
women’s liberation. In 1919, Vladimir Lenin wrote,
Notwithstanding all the laws emancipating woman, she continues to be a
domestic slave, because petty housework crushes, strangles, stultifies and
degrades her, chains her to the kitchen and the nursery, and she wastes her
labor on barbarously unproductive, petty, nerve-racking, stultifying and
crushing drudgery. The real emancipation of women, real communism,
will begin only where and when an all-out struggle begins (led by the
proletariat wielding the state power) against this petty housekeeping, or
rather when its wholesale transformation into a large-scale socialist
economy begins...Public catering establishments, nurseries, kindergartens-here we have examples of these shoots, here we have the simple,
everyday means, involving nothing pompous, grandiloquent or
ceremonial, which can really emancipate women, really lessen and abolish
their inequality with men as regards their role in social production and
public life.158
In 1919, there was no safe and effective method for performing abortions;
however, had one existed, Lenin most certainly would have supported it as a means of
empowering women by giving them the ability to decide if, when, and how many
children they wished to have.
While abortion was one of unification’s central issues, the Frauenfrage was not
yet answered when East German and West German united in 1990. The treaty of
unification that was signed allowed current abortions laws in East and West Germany to
remain in effect until the Bundestag could agree on a new law.159 In 1992, legislators
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signed an agreement, known as the “compromise agreement,” that made abortion legal
under nearly all circumstances. However, members of Chancellor Kohl’s party and the
Bavarian government immediately challenged the law in the Constitutional Court. In
1993, the Constitutional Court ruled that abortion was illegal under the German
constitution, as the state is required to protect human life. However, the Court ruled that
neither doctors who perform abortions or women who have them will be prosecuted, but
women must receive counseling three days prior to receiving the abortion, and the
counseling must attempt to dissuade the woman from having the abortion.160 The court
stated, “The woman must be aware that the unborn child has its own right to life.”161
Abortions for extreme circumstances, such as when the pregnancy endangers the life of
the mother, remained legal. While the court’s ruling has not prevented German women
from receiving abortions, it has forced them to pay for them, as state medical insurance
will not pay for illegal acts.162 Consequently, the ruling made abortions more difficult for
women to access. Finally, in 1995, the Bundestag passed a law that meets the
requirements set forth by the court.163 While this was not the result for which feminist
groups had hoped, the new ruling by the constitutional court was an improvement over
the 1975 ruling, which made abortions nearly impossible to obtain. Still, nearly five years
after the unification of the German state, the Bundestag passed a law regulating abortion.
When the changes in German abortion law are examined from a wider
perspective, a link between modernization and women’s right can be found. Furthermore,
the economic integration of women into a state’s economy can be linked to abortion laws.
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According to Silva Meznaric and Mirjana Ule, contributors to Women in the Politics of
Postcommunist Eastern Europe, women’s rights are closely linked to state
modernization. They describe a modernized society as one in which “…people are
mobile…in a modernized society not only people but also goods, information, ideas
circulate with a degree of ease and flexibility. …In a modernized society, books,
newspapers, teachers, students, artists, and their products circulate. Obstacles to their
circulation are embedded in modern societies, but so are procedures for overcoming those
obstacles.”164 Furthermore, “delayed modernization” is expressed as a society “…in
which women are absent from the public sphere, a civil society is lacking, the labor
market is divided by gender…”165 It is a reasonable assumption that a modernized society
is a prerequisite to the improvement of conditions for women within the state. In a society
where people are unable to interact and share information freely, it would be difficult to
organize a movement for women’s rights. Consequently, it follows that within a
modernized society, women will fight for the improvement of their condition.
It is this fight that can be witnessed within the pages of German women’s
magazines during the unification period in their pursuit for legalized abortion.
Conversely, it could be argued that the fight for legalized abortion should have taken
place earlier in West Germany, and it did, in the early 1970s. This movement, however,
was not successful in establishing the right to a legal abortion in the West. Still, West
Germany can be considered to have been a society that has not yet achieved complete
modernization in the early 1970s, as women were largely absent from the public sphere
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and the job market was divided by gender. The fact that this movement was unsuccessful
can be linked to the inherent gender inequality that existed in West German society in the
1970s. According to Marilyn Rueschemeyer, women in the West were regulated back to
their roles as wives and mothers in the post-war years. By 1985, only 45% of women in
the FRG worked outside of the home, and they contributed only 18% of household
income.166
Conversely, in East Germany, 90% of employable women either worked or were
enrolled in an educational training program; 70% of GDR women completed an
apprenticeship or vocational training program, and the level of education of women forty
years old and younger was equivalent with that of men in the same age group.167 Clearly,
Eastern women were better integrated into the economy of West German women; as a
result, it is not surprising that Eastern women had achieved the right to a legal abortion.
German unification not only politically united Germany, but it also united the
German people. The unification period gave West German women the chance to unite
with their Eastern counterparts and to examine how the rights that Eastern women had
obtained under socialism positively affected their lives. Unification gave the women of
the FRG another opportunity to fight for the right to a legal abortion, while at the same
time, providing the motivation for the fight to occur. Although the outcome of the anti§218 movement was imperfect, the 1992 solution was an improvement over the previous
policy, and it can be considered a step forward for women’s liberation in Germany.
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By the end of the unification period, abortion had become so central to the
women’s movement for both “West-frau” (Western women) and “Ost-frau” (Eastern
women) that it had come to symbolize the women’s movement itself.168 By 1993, when
the Bundestag passed the Compromise Agreement, Eastern and Western feminists had
firmly established themselves in two different camps. West German feminists often
believed themselves to be superior to Eastern feminists, due to “…the superiority of
Western feminist discourse and their years of organizing experience…,” and those from
the West claimed that they could speak for all German women.169 Yet, East German
women were not yet ready to end their identification with East Germany and “disavow
the claim that women had somehow achieved emancipation under state socialism.”170 For
East German women, the fight for the right to a legal abortion became a way to assert
“their identities as emancipated East German women.”171 Ost-frauen were unwilling to let
Western women speak for all German women and simply accept the Compromise
Agreement under the auspices that all women would be better off under the new law;
East German feminists reminded Western feminists that while the agreement might be an
improvement for them, East German women had lived under a considerably more liberal
law for twenty years.172 In the end, the abortion question became much bigger than itself;
it was no longer simply a matter of the right to a legal abortion—it had become “an act of
remembering.”173 It had become a way to fight the assumption that the GDR was just one
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big unfortunate accident—it was a reminder of the “emancipatory moments of [the
GDR].”174
The Frauenfrage did not turn out as many feminists would have wished; German
women were not given the right to an abortion within the first three months of pregnancy
without question. However, women were successful in gaining practical access to
abortions through decriminalization. German women were also successful in coming
together to build a campaign to fight against an issue that they believed infringed on their
rights as women, and essentially, it is that concept that lies at the root of feminism.

Chapter 3: Pornographie, Arbeit und Kinder
While abortion may have been the issue that took center stage in the debate over
women’s issue during the unification period, it was certainly not the only issue discussed
in the East-West dialogue. Alice Schwarzer, editor-in-chief of Emma, was so prominent
that she was individually able to shape the discourse of the unification debate, to some
degree. Through her status, she was able to enter her favorite issue—anti-pornography
legislation—into the debate, despite a lack of broad based support. Additionally, a
number of other significant issues surrounding children and family, as well as their
relationship to women in the workforce, came to the forefront during this period—most
notably, the issue of childcare. Capitalism and Communism had thoroughly impacted the
way people lived in East and West Germany; the differing political systems had led to
substantial differences in social policy in the East and West, and one area in which these
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differences were most obvious was the realm of family policy. As with other issues,
unification brought about the need to reassess these policies in both East and West
Germany, in order to develop a single set of policies for the entire country.
Pornography
In 1970s, Alice Schwarzer began a campaign against pornography on the grounds
that she believed it degraded women through the depiction of submissive sex acts. The
wider feminist movement did not adopt the campaign, but it continued to be an issue
within the movement because of Schwarzer continued dedication—and continued
dedication of resources—to the issue. Unification provided an opportunity for Schwarzer
to once again bring anti-pornography legislation to the forefront as part of the feminist
discourse, as pornography was forbidden in the GDR under §125 of the penal code.
Another interesting issue brought up by unification was pornography. Still, almost as
soon as the Wall fell, pornography inevitably spread to the GDR, with sex video bars
popping up in even the smallest villages. Additionally, the German Sex League wanted to
begin a special chain of stores in the GDR that would sell sex-related materials.175
What remains most stunning about the coverage afforded to pornography during
the unification debate is that Schwarzer almost single-handedly brought the issue to the
table. Since the inception of the anti-pornography campaign, progressive feminists
defended the right to produce pornography, and to participate in sex work, as legitimate
sexual rights, as long as the woman willing consented to participation. However,
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Schwarzer viewed pornography as, “…the sexual representation of women, and also,
partially of men, whereby sexuality is connected with degradation and force.”176
In the mid-1970s, Schwarzer kicked off her anti-pornography campaign (PorNo
campaign) against the portrayal of women in sexist advertising and pornographic “art”
with a lawsuit against Stern magazine.177 Schwarzer, along with ten other women,
charged that, “that the sexist representation of women on the covers was an affront to
their dignity.”178 According to Heather MacRae, “This was the first public attempt to
reframe the question of pornography to address its impact on women everywhere. Emma
argued that the objectification of a single woman and the commodification of this woman
as a sex object was degrading to all women.”179 Although the women lost the legal battle,
it was considered a moral victory, as the judge commented that be found them in the
“moral right” but legally “in the wrong.”180 Schwarzer then launched PorNo in an attempt
to change the law in West Germany.
In 1987, Schwarzer published a draft of her anti-pornography legislation in
Emma. §1, the general clause, reads, “Women or girls, who by the production, spreading,
or public-making of pornography, are harmed in their right to dignity or liberty, physical
well being, or life, are entitled to compensation for damages resulting from it.”181
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Furthermore, the definition of pornography in the legislation is wide. It considers any
pictures or words in which women are “degraded” or portrayed as “sexual objects” as
pornography. While it does give specific examples, such as rape “vaginally, anally or
orally,” it also defines any penetration by objects as pornography.182 However, the most
problematic statements appear in §3, “Eligibility for Benefits.”183 In section part of §3, it
states that women and girls are entitled to compensation if they see “pornographic
representations” that offend them. In other words, it is not necessary to participate in the
production of the pornography in order to claim harm by it; all that is required is that one
sees it.
Schwarzer faced a variety of responses to her proposed legislation. The ruling
CDU party chairmen on Women, Family & Health issues, Rita Sussman, welcomed the
anti-pornography proposals; she announced a ruling coalition hearing on the topic as well
as a women’s caucus on the subject—neither ever took place.184 The FDP never “found
the time” to investigate the matter.185 MacRae characterizes these responses as a simply
dismissal of the issue.
The Green and SPD parties reacted different, with both holding hearing on the
issue. The Greens held a hearing on September 8, 1988. The Green Party had a difficult
time with the issue, as they supported both women’s rights and the equality of the
individual, on one hand, but on the other hand, they supported personal choice and
freedom from censorship; MacRae credits Waltraud Schoppe with the best summary of
the Green Party stance, “…when she declared that she could not support the legislation
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because she ‘wanted to continue to be able to buy pornos in the supermarket.’”186 The
SPD held hearings on September 13-14, 1988, which were considered to be productive;
the rehashed many of the issues from the 1970s, however, they did not come to any
conclusion on the matter and proposed no legislation as a result of the hearings.187
Notably, some of Schwarzer’s most outspoken opponents were other feminists.
MacRae describes the viewpoints of these opponents:
At least one sector of the more radical of the German feminist movements
(the so-called autonomous movement) criticized the proposals as not
radical enough and too Staatfixiert (fixated on the state). Others suggested
that pornography was a vital part of sexuality and eroticism and as such
was important to women's self-expression and indeed emancipation.
Some, in particular women working as and with prostitutes, opposed the
legislation, fearing that it might actually worsen the position of women
working in the sex industry. These women feared that a law opposing
pornography would force the sex business underground and as a result
make regulation even more difficult. Finally, it is important to note that
these debates took place against the backdrop of a comparatively vocal
S&M movement, whose supporters clearly opposed any further
restrictions on pornography.188
Opposition by other feminists certainly did not help Schwarzer’s cause—it is difficult to
make progress when those within your own movement cannot come to an agreement.
As a result, Schwarzer’s use of unification to give new life to her ailing
movement was not unexpected, particularly given the existing illegality of pornography
in the GDR. Für Dich’s discussion with Schwarzer and four others provides insight into
Schwarzer’s perspective, and provides hints at why Schwarzer’s PorNo legislation never
became law. Besides Schwarzer, those who took part in the discussion were: Christina
Schenk, a scientific researcher at Humboldt University, who was working on research on
lesbian lifestyles, she was also the spokeswoman for the Independent Women’s
186
187
188

ibid., 326
ibid., 327
ibid., 326
66

Federation; Professor Lykke Aresin, chief of the Marriage and Sexuality Advisory Board
in Leipzig; Professor Kurt Starke, director of the Central Institute for Youth Research,
and head of the department for Partner and Sexual Research; Dr. Hartmut Bosinksi,
pediatrician and sex researcher at Humboldt University.189
The discussion begins with Für Dich commenting that everyone you ask for a
definition of pornography gives you a different answer. Christina Schenk immediately
goes on the offensive with Schwarzer, stating that, in addition to the comment by Für
Dich, she would like Schwarzer to tell her if, along her condemnation of the depiction of
degrading sex acts, she also condemns those who enjoy participating in those sex acts.190
In other words, Schenk is asking Schwarzer if she has a problem with people who engage
in BDSM activities. Schwarzer responses:
Not at all. Everyone should love as they please. In our discussion we are
only concerned with what is publicly spread, and thus, the influence it has
on our culture and society. What is happening now in the GDR is only the
beginning. In the FRG, we have, in the meantime, a “pornification” of the
whole culture. The effects on young people are enormous; rapes at schools
are part of everyday life.191
Schwarzer’s comment is important for several reasons. First, she attempts to
separate her opinion on pornography from her evaluation of those who portray
“degrading” sex acts privately. She argues that she is only concerned with the influence
that the public display of these sex acts has on society; however, it is difficult to separate
189
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a condemnation of the visual representation of the act from a condemnation of the act
itself, which leads to the question of whether or not it is really possible for Schwarzer to
consider the representation of these acts as immoral without considering the acts
themselves immoral. Furthermore, it is also question as to whether it is possible that
Schwarzer fully accepts the rights of people to partake in what she considers to be
degrading sex acts.
Secondly, in her comment, Schwarzer draws a connection between the depiction
of degrading sex acts and the behavior of young people. She sees a direct correlation
between the availability of pornography and rape. At best, this association is tenuous, as
looking at pornography and making the decision to commit rape are two very different
acts. Schwarzer seems to believe that, in theory, if young people did not see pornography
they would never be exposed to these types of sex acts, and consequently, would not
commit them because they would not be able to come up with the idea on their own.
However, this theory is problematic, as BDSM fetishes, such as rape, are not a result of
pornography, pornography is a result of fetishes.
Furthermore, Professor Starke explains that a prohibition against pornography is
relatively useless; he states:
A prohibition is senseless, it can be interpreted arbitrarily ([the law] gives
no exact criteria), is usually hypocritical, is an expression of a double
moral standard, bourgeois, prudery, and hedonic adverseness. Who would
want to give other people the power to prescribe what one may see, read,
or hear. The harmless consequences of pornography are hardly eliminated
by an ineffective law.192
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Professor Starke’s comment also makes very important points. First, any law
against pornography will be subjective and would impress the morals of a group of
individuals on everyone; he implies that this is a dangerous road to travel down, as it
impedes the right of the individual to make their own decisions about what they are
exposed to.
Also, his statement makes the important point that making pornography illegal
will do little to mitigate any harmful impact it might have. Additionally, Schenk points
out that to make pornography illegal would not eliminate it; instead, it would be driven
underground, which only makes it more difficult to discuss within the public sphere.193
The points made by Starke and Schenk are important because they acknowledge that
outlawing pornography is not the best solution to the problem.
Schwarzer closes the discussion with the statement:
Feminists are for sexual freedom, however it is expressed. But
pornography destroys not only the woman, and it makes her the victim
while assigning men the role of actor, but it destroys sexuality in general.
If we want to protect sexuality, we must contribute to overall living
conditions, which make the expansion of desire at all possible and
contributed to equal rights. Desire is only possible between equals.194
This statement summarizes Schwarzer’s argument against pornography well. She
believes that pornography somehow cheapens sexuality at the expense of women.
Leuten vorschreiben lassen, was er sehen, lesen oder hören darf. Schädliche Folgen von
Pornographie lassen sind durch ein nicht wirksames Gesetz schwerlich ausschließen.
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However, what she has missed in her argument is the essence of Voltaire’s Principle,
which states, “I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right
to say it.” She has forgotten that sexual freedom requires that all sexual activity between
consenting adults must be accept, and furthermore, sexual freedom requires that adults be
allowed to make their own decisions about the sex-related material they expose
themselves to. Instead, Schwarzer’s argument reeks of, “what is good for me is also good
for you,” which establishes her as a moral authority on sexuality. The establishment of
any moral authority on sexuality poses a danger to sexual freedom, which helps to
explain why so many feminists opposed Schwarzer in her fight against pornography.
Emma adopted two campaigns during the unification debate: a campaign against
§218 and a campaign for civil regulations to control pornography.195 In broader terms,
these campaigns were about increasing choices and limiting choices, respectively. This
helps to explain why feminists supported the anti-§218 campaign unanimously, while the
PorNo campaign was far less successful at gathering widespread support. Ultimately,
Schwarzer could not build enough support for her PorNo campaign, either among
politicians or the public. Her proposal died with the end of unification.
Women, Children, and Career
To understand this debate, it is critical to first understand the differences in family
policy in the FRG and GDR. The policy that each Germany would follow was essentially
established by the mid-1950s. The GDR, like the rest of the Soviet Bloc countries,
developed a policy of full integration of women into the labor force, as this followed the
socialist prescription of equality through labor. Many GDR family policies, including the
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establishment of free kindergartens and childcare and legal abortions, were developed for
the purpose of allowing women to work in “lifetime, full-time paid employment,” as was
normal for men.196 In other words, policies that helped women were created as a method
of furthering socialism, as Marxism conceptualizes the “worker as “a man freed of
responsibility from reproductive labor, ” rather than as methods of furthering feminism or
gender equality. 197 The policy of gender-blind employment in the GDR was developed
early on, as can be seen in the repeal of the portions of the German Civil Code
(Bürgerliches Getzbuch) that regulated women’s integration into the workforce in
1950.198 The GDR, like many other Soviet bloc states, had a significant population
problem in the post-war years, which created the need for women to work as well as have
children. In the early 1970s, the GDR adopted a set of policies that would be commonly
referred to as Muttipolitik, or “mommy politics.”199 These specifically targeted policies
were designed to encourage women to pursue both motherhood and paid employment in
the GDR; it was the specific purpose of these policies “to stop the decline in rates of
childbearing without resorting to coercive measures.”200 The most prominent of the
Muttipolitik policies introduced in the 1970s and 1980s were:
…paid time off for housework (a reduction of the ‘normal’ work week
from 43.5 to 40 hours for mothers of two children or more); a ‘baby year’
of paid leave for the birth of the first child, increased to eighteen months
of support for the second and later births; four to eight weeks of paid leave
for the care of sick children. Provision of childcare was also expanded and
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strengthened, so that as of 1988, 81 percent of pre-school children were in
heavily subsidized public facilities, costing about sixty-five cents per day
per child. N addition to the ‘baby year,’ infant care was available in day
nurseries in the community and at the mother’s workplace.201
These policies were successful in allowing women to be both mothers and workers. As of
1989, 90 percent of employable women in the GDR were working or in school; they
contributed about 40 percent of the household income.202
An examination of family structure in West Germany yields quite different
results. In the post-war years, the FRG developed a “social market economy,” wherein
men were the prescribed breadwinners and married heads-of-household. The role of
women in this system was to fill the unpaid caretaking jobs.203 In West Germany, the
family unit was established as a stabilizing force. “Solid marriages and healthy families
headed by strengthened patres familias,” writes Ilona Ostner, “counted as a bulwark
against the other world of novelty, instability, and an unknown future, as a means to cope
with scarce space, time, and money during the 1950s.”204 While an equal rights provision
was added to the 1949 Fundamental Law, there was no significant family and marriage
law reform in the FRG until 1977. The prevailing belief in West Germany was that the
government should not interfere with the private sphere; in other words, the male headof-household was given the “last word” in all-important familial and marital decisions.205
In the postwar years, West German women were regulated back to roles within the home
and placed on the wife-and-mother-track. FRG policies were fairly successful in keeping
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women out of the labor force and in the house, in 1985 only 45 percent of West German
women worked (the percentage had increased to 50 percent by 1989), and they
contributed only 18 percent of household income.206
While West German women were not totally without parental benefits, they were
far more limited than those given to women in the GDR. As of the mid-1980s, Western
women were entitled to fourteen weeks of maternity leave, which included a stipend and
employer’s supplement that was equal to their wage or salary. If women chose to
continue their maternity leave, they received a small stipend between weeks fifteen and
thirty-two of their leave. In the mid-1980s, only 3 percent of children under three years
old were enrolled in public daycare.

207

Furthermore, mothers received only five days

annually paid leave to care of sick children. Generally, these limited parental benefits
made it difficult for women to have successful careers and also be mothers.208
Given the radical differences between female work force participation and
parental benefits in East and West Germany, it would be expected that East German
women would have made significantly more progress in building successful careers.
However, when the data is examined, the results are quite the opposite; women in the
GDR did not, in practice, achieve significantly higher status in employment. In both
Germanies, the level of women in the highest-level executive positions remained below 4
percent; while East German women held more middle-management positions (about onethird of middle-management positions were held by women in the GDR) than West
German women, the percentage of women in middle-management in the GDR was low
206
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considering the high-level of participation in the workforce.

209

Additionally, women in

both Germanys held very few lectureships (C2 professorships), as of 1992 women held
only 7.7 percent of higher-ranking professorships.210 Rueschemeyer comments,
“Although there were considerable differences between the two German states, in general
the higher the positions, the lower the percentage of women; this was their situation at
work, in the union, and in the government in the mid-1980s.”211 Furthermore, while many
GDR women were employed, the labor force was still segregated. Myra Marx Ferree
states,
Women were 77 percent of all workers in the education and 86 percent of
those in health and social services; virtually all the secretaries, nurses, and
preschool teachers were women. Women workers were also concentrated
in gender-segregated industrial jobs, such as textiles and electronics
assembly (68 percent) rather than machine shops (30 percent). Although
East Germany formally barred women from only 30 of 289 officially
recognized skilled trades, in practice women could not enter ore than onehalf of these occupations.212
While only a small number of women would be expected to be in positions of power in
West Germany, the fact that women also lacked power in East Germany raises concerns
about the level of gender equality actually achieved in East Germany under the socialist
worker system.
In fact, East German Muttipolitik came with its own significant set of problems.
Although these state policies made it easier for women to have children, the root of the
policy law in the state’s desire for women to have more children and still be able to work,
not in a desire to emancipate women. Ina Merkel notes that even in the period of
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Muttipolitik, children remained a career setback, “Having children meant, in the end,
delaying and limiting one’s professional advancement.”213 Employers considered
children a disruption to the mother’s ability to work.214 In other words, instead of
promoting workplace equality, these policies promoted further inequality, as parental
responsibilities made women “unreliable workers,” which prevented them from assuming
positions that were more demanding, which also tended to be the most important
positions.215 Furthermore, due to the centrality of the workplace in GDR life, the
consequences of these policies were that women faced “an increasing attack on selfesteem.” Men, generally, viewed the parental and affirmative action policies direction a
women with distain, as little effort was made to explain why these policies were
necessary.216
Additionally, Muttipolitik took a toll on women’s personal lives and their
relationships with men as fathers and husbands. Myra Marx Ferree points out that the
“high rates of women’s labor force participation and their educational qualifications [as
well as] the widespread availability of childcare [in the East]” led Westerns to believe
that East German women were “more emancipated” than West German women; however,
in the East this “formal equality was used to make problems equal personal
shortcomings.”217 One major problem with these policies was that they were created
specifically for women. Fathers and grandmothers were only allowed to apply for these
benefits if the mother was unable to care for the children herself. While these gendered
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policies allowed for motherhood and work to be more compatible, they also encouraged a
“mode of thinking that not only defined women as mothers but also absolved men of any
formal responsibility as fathers.” Men generally believed that since women were “given”
the time to accomplish household duties and tasks, they were released from all household
and parental responsibilities. 218 Furthermore, Ina Merkel notes that shortages in the GDR
required women to spend more time working to find things their families needed. Women
severely lacked personal and leisure time in the East, as they were forced to maintain the
double-burden of wife and mother and worker.
Merkel sums the situation up well in her comment, “…the GDR became an
independent ‘socialist German nation.’ Mixed with this was the utopian notion of erasing
the social differences between the sexes. The assumption was that the economic
independence of women and their formal, legal equality were sufficient conditions to
achieve emancipation. As history showed, this idea proved to be shortsighted.”
However, these considerations do not mean that these policies did not have
limited advantages. Muttipolitik freed Eastern women from “social or economic
dependence on an individual man.”219 Women in the GDR could easily support children
without the father, and many did: 30 percent of children overall, and 70 percent of first
babies were born to unwed mothers. Unwed mothers in the East did not face the social
taboo that those in the West did, and additionally, unwed GDR mothers were supported
fully by the state, and even given preference in housing.220 Additionally, Muttipolitik and
combined with Fristenlösung, which freed them from the burden of unwanted children
and the economic strains that required marriage, led to the sexual liberation of women in
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East Germany. East German women were sexually active younger than West German
women, and also, had a “variety and multiplicity” of sexual experiences that rivaled those
of men.221 Still, it is critically important not to let these advantages overshadow the
problems faced by working mothers in the East.
However, the impact of Muttipolitik cannot be overlooked. After twenty years of
these policies, GDR women were unwilling to give up their low-cost childcare, Babyjahr,
and other benefits provided to working mothers. The pages of Für Dich from 1989-1991
are filled this articles that attempt to deal with the end of Muttipolitik. The article Kinder,
Küche und Karriere, which appeared in 1990, asks the question of how women will be
able to work and care for their families without the support system provided by the GDR.
According to the article, many GDR women feared they would lose social status and that
the career world would become the domain of men once again, with wives returning to
dependence on their husbands.222 In a letter to Für Dich, a single mother, C. Rybasczyk
of Damsdorf, expressed her concern that there would be no kindergarten for her son once
she finished maternity leave, and furthermore, without kindergarten and daycare, she
would not be able to work with two small children in the house. Additionally, she was
concerned that the loss of kindergarten would mean that young children would not learn
to get along with others.223
This letter and article express the major problems that accompanied the end of
Muttipolitik. The article reflects the problem noted by Susanne Rothmaler, which is that
for Eastern women, their identities and social lives were tied to the workplace, and that,
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for them, the loss of work meant loss of identity.224 In other words, socialism had
convinced GDR women that a person’s value is defined by their value as a laborer, rather
than as a unique individual. Additionally, since work was central to all aspects of life in
the GDR, to lose a job is, in many ways, to lose one’s life. Eastern women were used to
working outside of the home, they had no relationship with the notion of being at stay-athome mom or even a part-time worker. Consequently, the end of Muttipolitik seemed
devastating to these women not because it was perfect, but because it was all they knew.
The second problem, which is addressed in the letter, concerns how single
mothers would be able to both provide and care for their families in the Western system,
which seemed to necessitate marriage. This problem is somewhat more complex because
these women obviously could not reconstruct their family situations overnight to meet the
new model. Clearly, a solution needed to be found that would allow these women to
support their families in this new situation. However, this solution was not necessarily the
continuation of Muttipolitik.
The inherent problems with Muttipolitik can be seen in the way that GDR
feminists chose to approach the unification debate. Politically active GDR women did not
so much support the continuation of Muttipolitik, but instead, promoted the creation of a
society where women had equal rights in decision marking in all aspects of society. They
encouraged the development of a quota system for the inclusion of women in public life.
After 40 years in a system that discounted concepts of feminism and sexism, they
realized that “a women’s public arena had to be created in which women could come to
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agreement together on questions concerning their own histories, concerns, and conditions
of life.”225
Interestingly, by July 1990 resourceful women in the GDR had begun to explore
the possibility of private childcare, as a solution to both the lack of childcare and the rise
in unemployment. Privately paid babysitters and daycares had been unnecessary in the
GDR, so it was not a profession that anyone pursued. However, the combined factors of
the end of guaranteed, state-funded childcare and a sharp and sudden rise in
unemployment, made full-time childcare a career option. Für Dich ran a “special” article
in July 1990 titled, “First Meeting, Babysitter á la GDR.”226 The article is about an
unemployed secretary, Edith Hoffmann, who has just taken a job as the full-time
babysitter of a toddler named Hanna. With the end of state-provided childcare, many
women realized that they did not have a spouse, parents, or neighbors who could help
them care for their small children. These mothers realized that in order to continue
working, they would need to hire someone to care for their children, and the career of
babysitter was born.227 However, the idea of paid babysitters did not immediately
resonate with women in the GDR, as they were not used to having to pay for childcare.
Consequently, commercial childcare operations were not immediately profitable.
Profitability was also problematic because women did not have enough disposable
income available in order to pay babysitters sufficient wages. The women who were most
in need of childcare generally had working class jobs, which only allowed them to pay
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babysitters a small amount of money.228 The author of the article frames the quandary
well:
…to me it seems it would be a difficult decision. For thirty Mark, would I
want to be responsible for children for an entire day, to watch them, feed
them, and play with them? Children, whom I did not know? And
oppositely: How often could I, in addition to paying for an increasingly
expensive theater ticket, afford an additional 50 Marks for a babysitter?
How many people can do that, and who are they? Unmarried mothers
probably rarely succeed in taking a break from their domestic duties.229
The article does not attempt to solve this problem, but rather, it states that for a
business to ultimately be successful, it must be financially plausible for both the provider
and consumer of the service. In July 1990, it was much too early to determine if paid
babysitting would mitigate the childcare issue. The ongoing economic problems that
plagued the GDR since unification have prevented private childcare from solving this
problem, as private childcare is really a luxury of the wealthy. However, the importance
of this article lies not in its solution to a problem, but in its demonstration of the
willingness of Eastern Germans to engage imaginatively with two difficult situations—
the loss of state-provided childcare and rising unemployment.
When the FRG and GDR were united in 1990, women in both Germanys faced
uncertainly about what the future held. The process of unification left many questions
unanswered; as mentioned previously, the Frauenfrage, or abortion question, was not
228
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fully resolved until 1995, five years after unification. Many other questions, such as what
would be done to unite family policy in the FRG and GDR, were never satisfactorily
addressed. By examining the available information of the status of women in Germany
ten to fifteen years after unification, conclusions about the effects on women in the East
and West can be drawn.
Currently, Germany is facing a significant population problem. Each year,
approximately 100,000 more Germans die than are born.230 Today, the birth rate in
Germany is lower than it was during 1946, when Germany was in tremendous turmoil.231
Furthermore, the birth rate has dropped from 11 births per 1000 people for all of German
in 1987, to 8.6 births per 1000 people 14 years after unification.232233 This drop in the
birth rate is blamed partially on the spread of the availability of birth control and
abortions, but these factors do not fully explain why couples are deciding to have few or
no children. This problem is connected to a wider range of social factors, many of which
concern the conflict women face between careers, finances, and family. This view was
expressed by one couple, Jürgen and Claudia Schmitz, 41 and 35 respectively, who
commented that, while they are not against having children in principle, say, “…we find
life without them more beautiful,” as it allows them to go on spontaneous vacations and
be financially independent. Furthermore, Claudia cites fears about re-entering the career
world if she were to take maternity leave.234
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A feature article in Der Spiegel, titled Generation Kinderlos, or Generation
Childless, explains the conflict German women face. The article draws an interesting
parallel between European heads of government and their families and national birth
rates. The article points out that Germany’s first female chancellor, Angela Merkel, is 51
years old and married, but has no children—Germany’s birth rate in 1.3 children per
women, while French president Jacques Chirac has three children, two biological and one
adopted—France’s birth rate is 1.9 children per family.235 Chancellor Merkel’s status as a
successful, but childless, woman is not uncommon in Germany. While about one-third of
women who graduated from high school between 1960 and 1967 do not have children,
that number climbs to nearly 40% among university graduates.236
Germany’s population problem is not just a superficial observation; if the low
birth rate continues, Germany is likely to face economic consequences as a result. Fewer
children mean fewer workers to support the welfare state model as the population ages;
additionally, fewer births mean that Germany will have fewer consumers in the future, as
well as fewer skilled workers.237
The article presents a number of problems as contributing factors to the desire of
women to either forgo children altogether, or have only one child. One major problem
centers around childcare. There is a severe lack of childcare in Germany, especially for
children under three. In total, there are only enough daycare spots available for 9% of the
children under age three; when divided between Western states and former Eastern states,
the problem is even more profound. While the East has childcare spots available for 37%
of children under three, the West has spots available for only 3%. Furthermore, childcare
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also tends to be very expensive, which limits the number of children families can
financially handle. Madelaine Piljagic, 29, who makes approximately 1000 per month,
she pays 150 , or 15% of her income, for childcare for her son.238 Previously, she paid as
much as 280 per month, or 28% of her income, for childcare. She commented that while
she would like to have another child, but she cannot afford to have a second child.239
Another problem believed to contribute to childlessness among women is the
length of time that children are in school, and consequently, the length of time they are
financially dependent on their parents. German children start school, on average at 6.7
years old and often do not graduate from secondary school until they are 20; the average
at which people graduate from university is 26.240 The average German child does not
leave home until they are 25; they are among the oldest of Western Europeans when they
leave home, surpassed only by Italians, who leave home, on average, at age 30.241 In
other words, unlike in the United States, where children are often not more than an 18-22
year financial commitment, German children are a 20-26 year financial commitment.
A third significant problem is that when Germans leave home, they begin what
sociologists have termed the “rush hour of life,” which takes face between the ages of 2735.242 A new report from the German Federal Government shows that Germans may
experience more pressure during these years than their European counterparts. The report
states, “…in this short phase of approximately 5-7 years decisions must be made and
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realized, which, more or less, impact their entire lives.”243 Consequently, people put off
having children, and the unintended consequence of their temporary childlessness is
“permanent, inadvertent childlessness,” says (Geissener(?) Familienwissenschaftlerin)
Uta Meier.244
Women, whom, in this generation, are better educated than men (42% versus 36%
are university graduates) are presented, under the current circumstances, with the difficult
decision of having a career or having a family. While the GDR’s Muttipolitik was
imperfect and had significant structural social problems, it allowed women to work by
providing ample, lost-cost, childcare that allowed mothers to work. Oppositely, the
Federal Republic culturally encourages the father as breadwinner, mother as at-home
caregiver model, which is strongly reinforced in a tax hold that rewards single income
households; it is this model that the GDR was forced to adopt upon unification.245
Furthermore, this situation is made more difficult by the fact that the glass ceiling
is still firmly in place in Germany. Companies, like McKinsey, for whom Birgit Plank,
mother of two, works, are considered to be doing a better job of hiring women into top
management positions than others, even though only 4 percent of their top management
positions are filled by women.246 Additionally, while women hold 39% of doctoral
degrees in Germany, only 13.6% of professors and 9.2% of C4-professors (full
professors) are women.247 In the military, prospects are even worse—in 2004, of the 252
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junior officers, none of them are women.248 Angelika Koch, in her article, “Equal
Employment Policy in Germany: Limited Results and Prospects for Reform,” comments
on the link between motherhood and discrimination in the workplace, “The
discrimination of women in employment is largely a result of the traditional sexual
division of labor, insufficient opportunities that allow for reconciliation of family and
employment, as well as discriminatory attitudes against working women.”249 The
problem is not that women are not working—in the West, in 1998, 59% of all Western
women and 57.9% of all Eastern women were employed, as opposed to 74.4% and 65.8%
of men, respectively—45.7% of all women were employed in “standard full-time
employment” (not self-employed, non-contractual, full-time work), versus 67.3% of
men.250 While fewer women work full-time, they are not proportionally represented in
leadership roles.
Koch blames employment discrimination against women on structural social
problems, as well as the corporatist standpoint, which views mothers as problematic
employees because their children are a liability; in other words, women are not
considered to be the best choice economically.251 Currently, federal policy concerning
gender discrimination in employment is insufficient for dealing with this issue, as the
model relies on self-monitoring and does not provide for sanctions against companies that
do not comply.252
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The question that presents itself is whether this conflict between work and
motherhood is just an unfortunate, unavoidable consequence of capitalism that can only
be solved through a socialist solution, such as the one created by the GDR, or whether
there is a capitalist solution to the problem that would better fit the united FRG?
There are, in fact, many possible solutions to this problem for the united
Germany, which do not require a return to Muttipolitik. McKinsey, the previously
mentioned company for whom Birgit Plank works, is exploring one possible solution to
the mother-career conflict. As part of its Women’s Initiative, McKinsey is exploring onsite daycare for employees as a possible solution. Currently, they offer on-site childcare
in their Munich, Düsseldorf, and Frankfurt offices. This model have proven to be
beneficial to both mothers and the company, as it has made the company more attractive
to well-educated, successful women who want to have children, as well as to mothers,
who need childcare for their children.253 Other companies, such as BMW and the
pharmaceutical company Novartis have also had success with this solution.254
Furthermore, steps are being taken by the federal government to improve the
childcare situation. A financial incentive has been offered to states that change their
school days from the six-half-day-model to the five-full-day-model. By changing the
structure of the school day, the current after school childcare problems for young school
age children would be mitigated.255 Additionally, there is a movement in install public
kindergartens, like those in the United States and France, in place of the private
kindergartens that currently exist. The reason for this is two-fold: first, it would allow for
uniform early education, and second, it would eliminate the problem of too few
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kindergartens.256 Both Renate Schmidt, SPD-minister, and Ursula von der Leyen, social
minister of Lower Saxony, are major supporters of these incentives on the state and
federal levels. Furthermore, incentives are being put into place to provide tax benefits for
those who have children, which would increase with each additional child. Finally,
proposals have been offered to reduce the pressure during the “rush hour of life” period;
for example, the restructuring of the university system to provide for a Bachelors degree,
like in the American system, has been encouraged partially because it is believe that it
will reduce the amount of time women must spend in school.
However, the glass ceiling will not be broken by improved childcare alone. Koch
believes that in order to break down structural discrimination, several key steps must be
taken. First, she recommends that in order to combat “occupational segregation,” policies
need to be put into place that assist the entrance of women into these fields; for example,
through a flexible quota system. Secondly, the installation of transparent and fair hiring
practices. Thirdly, equity offices should be established to oversee decisions at the firm
level and to promote women’s interests within firms and unions. Fourth, a means of
pursuing meaningful litigation with meaningful sanctions, including monetary sanctions
should be established; furthermore, she believes class action anti-discrimination suits
should be made possible. Fifth, the awarding of public contracts should be linked to equal
treatment measures. Sixth, a national equal opportunities commission should be
established “…to control and monitor the regulation of gender-based employment
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equality and to help individuals and firms in this area.” Seventh, to establish policies that
prevent indirect wage discrimination.257
Many less radical women’s right activists have proposed Koch’s fourth
suggestion, which suggests the development of a method for pursuing class action
lawsuits under German law, as a solution. Eva Kolinsky, a moderate German feminist,
notes that the inability to seek class action suits has hindered German women in their
pursuit of equality since the 1970s, when labor equality laws were passed. She comments
that the initial legislation prevents women from seeking reimbursement for loss of
potential earnings, which had limited the effects of equal employment legislation.258 Both
Koch and Kolinsky are suggesting that without significant monetary ramifications,
companies are unlikely to fully embrace equality legislation. In many cases, it is these
types of suits that have forced big business to change their practices in ways that
legislation could not in other countries, for example the United States, and consequently,
allowing class action suits might be an effective way to expedite this process.
While Koch’s model may seem idealistic, Germany’s intense problem with
gender equality within the workforce requires that significant measures be taken to offset
the structural discrimination women face. Fully integrating women into the workforce,
not only into lower level positions, but also into leadership positions, will require a
substantial commitment on the part of government, industry and the public. However, it
is important to remember that these problems are not only a result of the policies of the
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FRG, but also was seen in the GDR. This is a social and cultural problem, not a problem
that has been created exclusively by capitalism or socialism.
In addition to examining social policy and anecdotal information about the status
of women in Germany fifteen years after unification, there is also a substantial amount of
relevant statistical information. These statistics include marriage and divorce information,
division of household labor statistics, and information regarding occupation.
One way to examine gender equality within a society is to look at the number of
unpaid work-hours men and women contribute to household work. In 1965, women in the
FRG averaged 39.3 hours spent on household chores, while men spent 10.2 on
average.259 In 2001, women spent 31 hours on household related work, while men spent
only 19.5 hours on average.260 In other words, women are still spending considerable
more time than men on household chores, despite the fact that more women are entering
the workforce. This trend was also evident in the GDR, where women took care of 75%
of household duties, while men performed only 25% of household work; this housework
divide varied only slightly from the FRG, where far fewer women worked, with women
doing 80% of household duties and men doing only 20%.261 While women performed
approximately 9 hours less of household labor in 2005 than in 1987, and men contributed
9 hours more, women continue to shoulder significantly more of the household labor
burden than men.
There have also been significant changes and marriage statistics. In 1986, the
majority of women in the FRG married for the first time between the ages of 20-24, in
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1987, the statistics for GDR followed the same pattern.262 In 2004, the mean age of
marriage had risen to 29.4, which means women are waiting until they are significantly
older to marry.263 What can be concluded from this data is that women find it less
necessary to be married fifteen years after unification, which signals less dependence on
men.
In September 1990, Emma published an article that discusses the increase in
unmarried women. The article is titled, “Nicht mit mir,” or “Not with me.” The article
points out that an increasing number of women are saying “No thanks” to marriage, in
favor of other lifestyle choices.264 The article divides these women into three groups:
those who choose to co-habitation with a male partner but do not marry; those who
choose civil unions with another woman (lesbians); and, those who choose to live alone
or with male or female roommates.265 Emma provides the following reasons as to why
women are choosing not to marry, “Unmarried women are simply better off. They are
more independent, vocationally successful, and have less housework hanging over their
heads,” in other words, as Emma sees it, there are a number of practical reasons that it is
sensible for women to remain single longer.266 One major conclusion that can be drawn
from this article is that putting off marriage is a side effect, however unintended, of a
better-educated female population. Women with more education are less financially
reliant on men, which makes marriage less necessary. Furthermore, it seems that
marriage can hinder the ability of women to pursue a careers, and, as a result, women
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have both a lesser desire and a lesser need to marry. Consequently, it is not surprising that
Germany has seen a decline in marriage rates.
Unification brought many issues concerning women to the forefront. The
differences in marriage and family law and policy between the FRG and the GDR led a
reassessment of these laws and policies as steps needed to be taken to unify the policies.
Unfortunately, the policy of rapid unification embraced by Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s
government resulted in a hasty evaluation of these policies at the government level.
Unification of the two German states, as previously mentioned, was less of a melding of
the two states and more of a takeover of the East by the West. Consequently, the laws and
policies of West Germany because the laws and policies on the entire land, regardless of
whether they were truly the best option. However, women in the two German states did
not pass over these differences so quickly, and many Western women recognized that
they too could derive benefits from higher levels of employment and diminished
dependency on men, as East German women had under socialism. While West German
women were not interested in adopting the model of the socialist GDR, many more did
choose to move out of the home and into the workplace in order to take advantage of the
benefits provided by financial independence in a capitalist system. Still, this transition
into the workplace has not been without its problems. Women in both Germanies soon
realized that without the family support policies provided by the GDR, it would be very
difficult to have both a career and a family. Women in both Germanies have said yes to
independence, at the expense of marriage and family. This decision has had repercussion
on the German state, however, and the German government must develop policies that
allow women to have both successful careers and families if they hope to reverse
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problems like the population crisis, as women will not give up their newfound
independence. While the government of the FRG learned little from the GDR, German
women from both sides of the divide learned much from GDR society—a woman’s place
is not only in the home.

Conclusion
If unification is seen as a merging, it appears that the GDR’s more progressive
social policies were rejected in favor of the FRG’s more restrictive model; however,
when unification is understood as a takeover of the GDR by the FRG, the true advantage
of unification is seen. The beauty of unification was that it presented an opportunity for
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German’s to assess their own society—to think about the policies and actions they
normally just accepted. This concept is critical to understanding that German women, as
a whole, gained—not lost—because of unification.
Foe better or worse, the two German states unified within a year. The GDR had
disintegrated rapidly, and the people of the GDR chose to quickly become part of the
FRG. Furthermore, the total collapse of the East German state meant that there was little
question that the laws and practices of the FRG would become the law of the united
nation. However, the coming together of two peoples, the true unification, ignited a
feminist debate that is slowly reshaping the policies of Germany in a way that is
advantageous to women. Obviously, this discussion, which is still going on, is a result of
the introduction of the more progressive social ideology of the GDR, and the women who
lived under them, into the Federal Republic. Many women on both sides of the former
divide want more progressive social policies towards women, and they have used the
model of the GDR as a starting point.
German women began during the brief unification period itself, mounting a
campaign for abortion rights for all German women. Feminists used unification as a tool
to implement change in FRG policy, and although women did not get the legislation they
had hoped for, they did manage to secure safe, accessible abortions for all German
women. Furthermore, unification brought the issue of working women to the forefront.
The majority of West German women had accepted their traditional role within the home
until unification. Unification introduced to the Federal Republic a large body of women
who saw regular, fulltime employment as part of their identities, which has encouraged

93

higher levels of employment and started a push for employment policies that are more
favorable to working mothers.
Unification created a feminist moment because it started a discussion on what it
meant to be a German woman in the late twentieth century. The moment has continued,
and German women are redefining gender roles—entering the workforce in record
numbers and forcing a discussion about who should be responsible for traditional
domestic duties. Women no longer feel obligated to stay home and care for their children
fulltime; instead, they are asking fathers to help.
Of course, the battle is not yet won. Substantial structural gender inequalities still
exist within the German system, which will have to be dealt with as Germans move
through the twenty-first century. However, Germans can no longer ignore the situation,
as more women are opting-out of motherhood as they become better educated and more
integrated into the labor force, which, in turn, has resulted in a birthrate that is too low.
German women are not willing to return to full-time domestic life, so policy changes will
have to be made to accommodate the German woman of the twenty-first century.
Certainly,

unification

had

numerous

negative

side

effects.

Rates

on

unemployment in the new Länder are abysmal and Eastern women have had to adjust to
the FRG model—a transition that has not been painless. However, these problems should
not undermine the importance of the feminist discourse that was started by unification.
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